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SQLGuard — permission before production writes

Mandate Bind (AP2 Intent x Ed25519)

sqlguard_bind
Read-onlyIdempotent

ABMP BIND: pay Exact USDC once via POST /v1/bind. Hashes AP2-style Intent Mandate text into the Ed25519 Execution Certificate (mandate_hash). Then free sqlguard_gate before execute.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
sqlYesExact mutating SQL to authorize under the mandate
mandateYesAP2-style Intent Mandate — what the human authorized this agent to do
agent_idYesAgent or wallet id for the bind receipt
schema_ddlYesCREATE TABLE … schema snapshot

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
priceNo
paymentNo
productNo
endpointNo

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description discloses a financial side effect ('pay Exact USDC once') and a state-changing action ('free sqlguard_gate before execute'), which directly contradicts the annotations readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false. This is a serious transparency failure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded, naming the endpoint and action in the first clause. It avoids filler, but is dense with specialized jargon (ABMP, AP2, Ed25519, mandate_hash) which may obscure meaning for less familiar agents.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool involves payment, hashing, and gate release, the description is too sparse. It omits prerequisites, payment amount/source, what happens without exact USDC, and the nature of the gate-freeing side effect. The contradictory annotations further impair completeness; output schema helps with return values but not process context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 100% coverage with descriptions for all four parameters, so the baseline is 3. The description adds context around `mandate` (hashed into the Ed25519 certificate) but does not meaningfully enhance understanding of `sql`, `schema_ddl`, or `agent_id`. It does not compensate beyond the schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description identifies the core action (ABMP BIND) with endpoint and mechanism (POST /v1/bind, Ed25519 certificate, mandate_hash), making the tool's purpose identifiable. However, it mixes several verbs (pay, hashes, free) and does not clearly differentiate from sibling tools like sqlguard_cert or sqlguard_gate beyond the workflow mention.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a clear sequencing cue ('Then free sqlguard_gate before execute'), implying when to use this tool in a multi-step flow. But it doesn't explicitly state when to use it versus alternatives or any exclusion conditions, so the guidance is implicit rather than explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

The tool set is dominated by overlapping buy/unlock paths (challenge, pilot, buy, catalog, cert, session, workday, sprint, profit, handshake) that are poorly differentiated, with many marked as legacy or off-table. Only a few tools (bind, gate, verify, effects) have clearly distinct roles.

Naming Consistency2/5

All tools share the sqlguard_ prefix, but the second part is a mix of nouns, verbs, and vague branding (gravity, profit, sprint, handshake). There is no consistent verb_noun pattern, making it hard to predict a tool's purpose from its name.

Tool Count3/5

24 tools is heavy for a permission gateway, and many are redundant legacy or alternative buy paths. While the count is within the 16-25 borderline range, the core functionality could likely be served by 8-10 tools.

Completeness3/5

The core authorization flow (handshake → challenge/unlock → bind/gate → verify) is present, but the surface is muddied by legacy and alternative paths that create dead ends. Missing tools for managing denials or configuring policies leave some gaps, though the central lifecycle is covered.