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Check administrator accounts

fleet__audit_admin_users
Read-onlyIdempotent

The administrator accounts of each chosen site (user_id, display name, roles, registered_at in UTC, extra_caps, and new: registered in the last 7 days; Royal MCP leaves out usernames and email addresses), users_with_extra_caps (users holding capabilities granted directly beyond their role, with roles, capabilities, registration date and powerful: the capabilities amount to administrator access for a user who is not an administrator), extra_caps_checked (all_users where the site offers Royal MCP's security check, administrators where it does not, not_reported on an older Royal MCP), flags (one sentence per new administrator or user with extra capabilities, most serious first), and where GuardPress is active, the account changes it logged recently (new or deleted users, role changes, email and two-factor changes, emergency unlocks) and the latest sign-in. Optional site_ids (default every connected site). Sites without GuardPress say account changes were not checked. Read only; it raises no alerts itself. Royally also checks the accounts of every connected site with Royal MCP every hour, with or without a security plugin, and raises an alert for a new administrator, which stays open after the account's first 7 days until a person acknowledges, resolves or dismisses it or the account is removed or is no longer an administrator (the 7 days only decide which accounts are flagged as new), and for extra capabilities, which closes once they are gone; these come from the security sweep (source royally_security_sweep) on sites whose security plugin it reads and from the account check (source royally_account_check) on the others, never both. Use it to spot an administrator nobody recognises, a recent role change or a hidden administrator.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
site_idsNoRestrict to these site ids. Omit for every eligible site.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive, but the description adds substantial context the annotations cannot: GuardPress-conditional outputs, the explicit statement that sites without GuardPress report 'account changes were not checked', the not_reported state for older Royal MCP, and the fact that the background hourly sweep (royally_security_sweep / royally_account_check, never both) is what actually raises alerts with a 7-day acknowledgement lifecycle. That tells the agent this call is passive and that alerts live elsewhere — exactly the kind of behavior it needs before calling.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The bulk is one enormous sentence with deeply nested parentheses listing output fields, followed by a second long block on the hourly alert lifecycle. The purpose is buried behind a return-field inventory, and the important framing ('read only, raises no alerts') arrives late; much of the alert-sweep detail is arguably tangential to invoking this tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so exhaustively: every top-level field is defined, conditional behavior per plugin is spelled out, and the empty/absent states (not_reported, not checked) are named. An agent has enough to call it with no parameters and correctly interpret the result.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single site_ids parameter is already documented as "Omit for every eligible site." The description restates the same default ("Optional site_ids (default every connected site)") without adding format, id-shape, or max-size guidance, so it neither compensates nor detracts. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening enumerates exactly what the tool returns — administrator accounts per site with user_id, display name, roles, registered_at, extra_caps, plus derived fields (new, users_with_extra_caps, extra_caps_checked, flags) and GuardPress account-change history — so an agent can tell it is an administrator-account audit rather than a generic user listing. It never states a verb up front (no 'Lists'/'Returns') and never names the siblings it differs from (e.g. wp_get_users, security_triage), so differentiation is inferred rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Use it to spot an administrator nobody recognises, a recent role change or a hidden administrator" gives concrete motivating scenarios, and "Read only; it raises no alerts itself" clarifies it is investigative rather than remediating. However, no alternative tool is named and no when-not-to-use condition is given, so the agent must infer routing against security_triage or wp_get_users.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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