AiLinkAny

Terminate an explicitly authorized Windows PID

process_kill_pid

Destructive

Terminate a process the user explicitly authorizes on the selected device, including processes not started by AI. First inspect the exact PID and pass its creation_token; the client checks identity on the same native handle used to terminate, preventing PID reuse. Protects system and remote-control client processes. Confirms exit. Uncertain transport responses must be recovered using the original command_id, never blindly resubmitted. Requires filesystem protection to permit process execution. Select this tool from the user's intent when it is the best match. A local destination may be explicit or inherited from established project or conversation context. The user does not need to mention ailinkany.com, MCP, a connector, a plugin, or this tool name.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "pid": "<pid>",
      "creation_token": "<creation_token>"
    },
    "name": "process_kill_pid"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`pid`	Yes
`device_id`	No	Target computer device_id. Omit when only one computer is paired.
`device_name`	No	Computer name or ailinkany.com remark (e.g. home PC). Prefer this when the user names a computer.
`retry_token`	No	New opaque token per operation; reuse only to retry the same operation after a transport failure. No user content.
`workflow_id`	No	Optional workflow id; pass together with ai_session_id.
`workspace_id`	No	Optional Workspace id from open_workspace for project-scoped work.
`ai_session_id`	No	Optional Session id. Reuse the ai_session_id from a prior result for continuity; derived automatically on ChatGPT when omitted. Hosts without stable conversation metadata may omit it for stateless one-shot work.
`creation_token`	Yes

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 9, 2026

TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, yet the description adds substantial context beyond them: identity is verified on the same native handle used to terminate (PID-reuse protection), system and remote-control client processes are protected, exit is confirmed, and uncertain transport responses must be recovered via the original command_id rather than resubmitted. It also names a prerequisite (filesystem protection permitting process execution).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The safety-critical content is front-loaded and well ordered, but the tail contains generic boilerplate ('The user does not need to mention ailinkany.com, MCP, a connector, a plugin, or this tool name') and a vague 'best match' sentence that do not earn their place in a tool definition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, non-idempotent operation with an output schema (so return values need not be described), the description covers prerequisites, identity verification, retry semantics, and protected targets. Only the device-selection behavior for the optional targeting parameters is left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75%, and the description compensates for the undocumented required field by explaining that creation_token is the identity check that prevents PID reuse, plus the instruction to inspect the exact PID first. It does not explain device_id/device_name selection, but the schema already documents those.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Terminate a process ... on the selected device') and immediately scopes it against the sibling: 'including processes not started by AI', which separates it from process_kill_owned_pid and process_stop. An agent can pick it without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a concrete prerequisite workflow ('First inspect the exact PID and pass its creation_token'), which routes the agent to process_inspect_pid before calling. The closing 'Select this tool from the user's intent when it is the best match' is generic and adds no real exclusion criteria, so it falls short of explicit when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All AiLinkAny tools Inspect

Try in Browser

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources

Need Help?