AiLinkAny

Write to saved connection session

connection_profile_write

Destructive

Writes terminal input to an existing SSH, Telnet, or serial connection session. Never use this tool to send a password or other secret; profile authentication secrets are injected locally by the Windows client. Select this tool from the user's intent when it is the best match. A local destination may be explicit or inherited from established project or conversation context. The user does not need to mention ailinkany.com, MCP, a connector, a plugin, or this tool name.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "session_id": "<session_id>",
      "input": "<input>"
    },
    "name": "connection_profile_write"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`input`	Yes
`device_id`	No	Target computer device_id. Omit when only one computer is paired.
`session_id`	Yes
`device_name`	No	Computer name or ailinkany.com remark (e.g. home PC). Prefer this when the user names a computer.
`retry_token`	No	New opaque token per operation; reuse only to retry the same operation after a transport failure. No user content.
`workflow_id`	No	Optional workflow id; pass together with ai_session_id.
`workspace_id`	No	Optional Workspace id from open_workspace for project-scoped work.
`ai_session_id`	No	Optional Session id. Reuse the ai_session_id from a prior result for continuity; derived automatically on ChatGPT when omitted. Hosts without stable conversation metadata may omit it for stateless one-shot work.
`append_newline`	No	Append CRLF after input. Defaults to false.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 9, 2026

TDQS

A3.6/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true, openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=false and readOnlyHint=false, so the risk profile is already structured. The description adds non-obvious context beyond that: authentication secrets are injected locally by the Windows client, so the agent must never route credentials through this call. It does not explain what the destructive risk actually consists of (arbitrary terminal input to a live session).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The first two sentences are tight and front-loaded, with the security constraint placed early where it matters. The trailing sentences ("Select this tool from the user's intent when it is the best match" and the list of terms the user need not mention) are low-value padding that dilutes the actionable content.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described, and the description covers the key risks for a destructive write tool: live-session requirement, secret handling, and destination selection. What remains thin is failure behavior (closed or dropped session) and how this differs from the control-channel sibling.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 78%, so most parameters are already documented in the schema (device_id, device_name, retry_token, ai_session_id, append_newline). The description only gestures at destination resolution ("explicit or inherited from established project or conversation context") without clarifying session_id vs device_id/device_name precedence or what 'input' may contain. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb and resource: "Writes terminal input to an existing SSH, Telnet, or serial connection session," which pins down the action and the transport targets. It does not, however, distinguish this from near-siblings like connection_profile_send_control or process_write_stdin, so an agent must infer the boundary from transport type alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is one concrete exclusion ("Never use this tool to send a password or other secret"), which is genuinely useful negative guidance. But "Select this tool from the user's intent when it is the best match" is boilerplate that adds no routing information, and the description never says when to prefer connection_profile_send_control or process_write_stdin instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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