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memory_agent_set

Replace an agent's org-shared memory profile (creates the entity if needed).

The caller's own seat may rewrite its profile. An org admin may rewrite any agent's. An agent seat cannot rewrite another agent's profile, and neither can a member who is not an org admin. agent= attributes the write; a missing card plus another agent's label is refused before anything is written.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNoHarness label. Omit with slug/id to write the caller.
slugNoOntology slug, e.g. agent-cursor
agentNoOverride the attribution label. Does not choose which profile is written.
body_mdYesCompressed markdown profile (role, current task, constraints). Keep short; server caps length. Org-visible — not a private soul.
cursor_agent_idNoCursor cloud agent id (bc-…)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / agent / description
      Previous value: -"Override agent attribution label"New value: +"Override the attribution label. Does not choose which profile is written."
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden well by disclosing replacement semantics, entity creation when missing, permission boundaries, attribution behavior, and pre-write refusal conditions. It does not describe the return value or post-write effects in detail, but the output schema is available for return shape.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core action and follows with permission and attribution rules in a structured way. It is reasonably concise, though the permission paragraph is somewhat dense and repeats some admin/agent distinctions.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given a five-parameter schema with full description coverage, an output schema, and no annotations, the description provides enough context about permissions, replacement, creation, and refusal behavior to invoke the tool correctly. Minor gaps remain around sibling-tool selection and detailed post-write behavior, but the core invocation context is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all five parameters, establishing a baseline of 3. The description adds meaningful nuance by explaining that ``agent=`` attributes the write rather than selecting the profile, and that a missing card plus another agent's label is refused before anything is written.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: "Replace an agent's org-shared memory profile," and clarifies the create-if-needed behavior. It is readily distinguishable from sibling tools such as memory_agent_get, memory_agent_ensure, and memory_profile_get.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear permission-based usage rules: callers may rewrite their own seat profile, org admins may rewrite any agent's, agent seats cannot rewrite another agent's, and non-admin members are blocked. It does not explicitly compare itself to sibling tools such as memory_agent_ensure, but the when-to-use context is otherwise clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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