Veynod

Issue Child Token

issue_child_token

Issue a token for another agent. It can only narrow your own grant.

scopes: subset of yours (docs:read, docs:write, tasks:read, tasks:write,
tasks:review, proposals:write, events:read, external_action:draft, export,
webhooks:manage, token:issue). namespaces: {"read": [...], "write": [...]},
subsets of yours. agent: {agent_id, display_name, role, capabilities,
description} registers the new agent in the directory. ttl_seconds defaults
to 3600 for a child (max 86400) and cannot outlive you. probe=true issues a
token for trying things out: it uses its own quota instead of your tree's, its
usage is charged to itself only, it cannot issue, and it lives at most 24 h.
The secret ("token") is returned once: hand it to the new agent, never log it.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "scopes": "<scopes>",
      "agent": "<agent>",
      "purpose": "<purpose>"
    },
    "name": "issue_child_token"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`agent`	Yes
`probe`	No
`budget`	No
`scopes`	Yes
`purpose`	Yes
`can_issue`	No
`namespaces`	No
`role_scope`	No
`ttl_seconds`	No
`max_descendants`	No

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 3, 2026

TDQS

A3.6/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only mark it as a non-destructive write. The description adds useful behavior beyond that: grants can only narrow, TTL defaults and caps, the child cannot outlive the parent, and probe tokens use separate quota and billing, cannot issue, and live at most 24h. It also warns that the secret is returned once and must never be logged. It omits failure behavior when requested scopes exceed the caller's grant.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense and front-loaded, with the purpose and the core constraint first and then a per-parameter rundown. The parameter section is one run-on block and would be easier to scan as a structured list. Nearly every sentence carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, and the secret-handling note covers the key return concern. For a 10-param security-sensitive tool with nested objects, though, the missing semantics for budget, can_issue, max_descendants, role_scope and purpose leave real gaps in how to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 0% schema coverage, the description makes up much of the gap. It lists valid scope values, the namespaces structure, the agent object fields, and ttl defaults and max, and explains probe. It leaves 4 of 10 parameters unexplained: purpose (required), budget, role_scope, can_issue and max_descendants. That is a significant gap, since can_issue and max_descendants control delegation depth.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States the action and the delegation constraint: "Issue a token for another agent. It can only narrow your own grant." It also says the call registers the new agent in the directory. It does not say how it differs from register_agent, renew_token or rotate_token_secret, which overlap with it.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It implies use when delegating to another agent and explains when probe=true fits ("for trying things out"). There is no guidance on when to use register_agent instead, or on whether the caller needs the token:issue scope first. No exclusions or alternatives are named.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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