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Destroy a release policy

destroy_policy
DestructiveIdempotent

Destroy one of an organization's release policies by name. A change to a policy applies to releases not yet decided. Changing a policy's enforcement or settings never changes a decided evaluation, and a running policy evaluation keeps the checker and enforcement it started with. A running policy evaluation whose checker hasn't started yet uses the current settings. Removing a policy, or changing its checker, cancels its running policy evaluations, so releases that waited only on it go ahead. Confirm with the user first. Past evaluations stay on the releases they evaluated. Destroying a policy that is already gone changes nothing. Requires connecting a Valet account.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
policyYesRequired. The policy's name, as list_policies reports it.
org_nameNoThe Valet organization the policy belongs to. Omit to use the organization the account joined first.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, yet the description adds substantial beyond-annotation detail: destruction cancels running policy evaluations and unblocks waiting releases, decided evaluations are untouched, deleting an already-absent policy is a no-op, and the Valet account prerequisite. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded and the safety instruction is present, but the paragraph runs six sentences and drifts into change/enforcement semantics that pertain more to set_policy than to destroy. Slightly long, though still information-dense.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 2-parameter destructive tool with full schema coverage, annotations, and no output schema, the description covers effects, idempotency, and auth. The one gap is that it never states the policy definition itself is permanently lost — it emphasizes what survives (past evaluations) rather than what is irrevocably destroyed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already documented in the schema. The description reinforces 'by name' for the policy parameter but adds no format, uniqueness, or lookup semantics beyond that — baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence gives a specific verb and resource with scope ('Destroy one of an organization's release policies by name'), and the use of 'destroy' plus 'by name' cleanly separates it from list_policies and set_policy among the siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It supplies concrete decision-relevant context: 'Confirm with the user first' and 'Requires connecting a Valet account,' plus the warning that removal cancels running evaluations. It stops short of naming a sibling alternative (e.g., use set_policy to modify instead of destroying), so no explicit when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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