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Have I Been Pwned

by io.github.troyhunt
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

Have I Been Pwned - Breach

hibp_get_breach
Read-onlyIdempotent

Look up a single public HIBP breach by its canonical breach name, such as Adobe.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe breach name to retrieve, for example Adobe.
response_formatNoFormat only the text content as markdown (default) or a JSON string. The same machine-readable data is always returned in structuredContent.markdown

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
breachNo
messageNoPresent when the tool returns an error.
guidanceNoAdditional guidance for resolving the tool error.
statusCodeNoPresent when the tool returns an error.
rateLimitResetAtNoUTC timestamp indicating when the current rate limit window should have reset.
retryAfterHeadersNoRetry headers that mirror the standard HTTP rate-limit response when applicable.
retryAfterSecondsNoHow long to wait before retrying, when the tool is rate limited.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedInput schema / properties / response_format / description
      Previous value: -"Format the text response as markdown (default) or JSON. structuredContent is always returned."New value: +"Format only the text content as markdown (default) or a JSON string. The same machine-readable data is always returned in structuredContent."
    • changedOutput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. First observed

TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already convey readOnlyHint and idempotentHint, covering the safety profile. The description adds no further behavioral detail (e.g., error handling, rate limits, or what happens for unknown breach names). It merely restates the action without adding value beyond annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single concise sentence front-loads the core action and includes an example. No unnecessary words; the description is appropriately minimal.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool is simple, and the schema and output schema cover parameters and return values. However, the description lacks any usage guidance (e.g., when to use this vs. listing breaches), which is a gap for an agent deciding among siblings. It is adequate but not fully complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both parameters are documented. The description adds an example for the 'name' parameter, which is helpful but not essential. Overall, it does not add significant meaning beyond the schema, so baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Look up') and resource ('single public HIBP breach') with an example, making the purpose clear. It implies distinction from list-style tools but does not explicitly differentiate from siblings like hibp_list_breaches.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. The description only states what it does, not when it should be selected. Sibling tools like hibp_list_breaches or hibp_get_latest_breach are not mentioned, leaving the agent to infer context.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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