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trooth_verify

Read-onlyIdempotent

Check the two signatures on a Trust Ledger Token (tlt2. or tlt. form, or its JTI) against Trooth's own token ledger. Returns valid, invalid (a signature does not check out), expired or revoked, or unclaimed when no token matches. Trooth's signature covers the signing event, not the claim bytes and not the truth of the claims; the issuing company's signature covers the payload.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tokenYesA Trust Ledger Token (tlt2. or tlt. form) or its JTI

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
statusYesMachine-branchable outcome for this lookup.
subjectYesThe company, domain or token this answer is about.
summaryYesThe same answer as the text content, for display.
evidenceNoPresent on a published profile. What this answer is built from, what it leaves out, and where to get the rest. The summary is a summary: the typed facts with their provenance are in the record at full_record.
claim_urlNoPresent when the subject has no published record (unclaimed or private).
provenanceYesWhere this answer came from. An honest_absence is missing data, never a judgment about the subject. A read_failed means Trooth could not read its own record at this moment and asserts nothing either way; retry rather than concluding. witnessed_reading: a published profile whose reading Trooth witnessed; the profile is not signed, and the one signed object is the reading's witness statement (see evidence.signed_artifact). connected_system_reads: read from systems the company connected. ledger_token_signatures: the result of checking a Trust Ledger Token's two signatures; the claims inside it stay the company's. witnessed_signed is DEPRECATED since 2026-09-26 and no longer returned; it meant any of the three above.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / evidence
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Present on a published profile. What this answer is built from, what it leaves out, and where to get the rest. The summary is a summary: the typed facts with their provenance are in the record at full_record.",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "counts": {
      +      "description": "The reading's counts, from the source named. witness_statement: read, as expected and not read in this reading. result_tally: an older reading's own tally, not a count of checks read.",
      +      "properties": {
      +        "as_expected": {
      +          "type": "integer"
      +        },
      +        "in_reading": {
      +          "type": [
      +            "integer",
      +            "null"
      +          ]
      +        },
      +        "not_read": {
      +          "type": [
      +            "integer",
      +            "null"
      +          ]
      +        },
      +        "read": {
      +          "type": "integer"
      +        },
      +        "source": {
      +          "enum": [
      +            "witness_statement",
      +            "result_tally"
      +          ],
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "type": [
      +        "object",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "facts_published": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "integer",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "full_record": {
      +      "description": "The canonical record as JSON, contract 2, with every typed fact, its provenance and its date where known.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "last_witnessed": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "omitted": {
      +      "description": "What the summary leaves out. Every item is in full_record.",
      +      "items": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "profile_signed": {
      +      "description": "Always false. The profile is not signed.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "schema": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "signed_artifact": {
      +      "description": "The one signed object behind this answer, or null when the reading carries none. It is served, byte for byte as signed, in the witnessStatement field of full_record.",
      +      "properties": {
      +        "covers": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "key_id": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "read_at": {
      +          "type": [
      +            "string",
      +            "null"
      +          ]
      +        },
      +        "type": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "verify": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "type": [
      +        "object",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / properties / provenance / description
      Previous value: -"Where this answer came from. An honest_absence is missing data, never a judgment about the subject. A read_failed means Trooth could not read its own record at this moment and asserts nothing either way; retry rather than concluding."New value: +"Where this answer came from. An honest_absence is missing data, never a judgment about the subject. A read_failed means Trooth could not read its own record at this moment and asserts nothing either way; retry rather than concluding. witnessed_reading: a published profile whose reading Trooth witnessed; the profile is not signed, and the one signed object is the reading's witness statement (see evidence.signed_artifact). connected_system_reads: read from systems the company connected. ledger_token_signatures: the result of checking a Trust Ledger Token's two signatures; the claims inside it stay the company's. witnessed_signed is DEPRECATED since 2026-09-26 and no longer returned; it meant any of the three above."
    • changedOutput schema / properties / provenance / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "witnessed_signed",
      -  "signed_scan",
      -  "live_observation",
      -  "honest_absence",
      -  "withheld_by_owner",
      -  "knowledge_base",
      -  "input_error",
      -  "self_declared",
      -  "read_failed"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "witnessed_reading",
      +  "connected_system_reads",
      +  "ledger_token_signatures",
      +  "witnessed_signed",
      +  "signed_scan",
      +  "live_observation",
      +  "honest_absence",
      +  "withheld_by_owner",
      +  "knowledge_base",
      +  "input_error",
      +  "self_declared",
      +  "read_failed"
      +]
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds valuable context beyond that: the distinct signature scopes (Trooth's signature covers the signing event, not claim bytes or truth; the issuing company's signature covers the payload) and the full set of possible return states (valid, invalid, expired, revoked, unclaimed). This enriches the agent's mental model of the verification semantics.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two sentences with zero filler. The first sentence states the exact action and scope; the second provides the critical nuance about signature coverage. Every word earns its place, and the most important information is front-loaded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The tool takes a single parameter with full schema coverage, has an output schema (not shown but indicated), and the description explains the return states and the semantics of the two signatures. Given the simplicity and existing annotations, nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% for the single 'token' parameter, so the schema already documents it as 'A Trust Ledger Token (tlt2. or tlt. form) or its JTI'. The description repeats the token forms but adds no new semantics beyond reinforcing what the schema states. At full coverage, baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states a specific verb ('Check') and resource ('two signatures on a Trust Ledger Token') and defines the scope (tlt2./tlt. forms or JTI). It distinguishes itself from sibling tools by focusing on signature verification, which is not implied by any sibling's name.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implicitly conveys when to use this tool—when you need to check a token's signatures—but does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it. Given the sibling names (ask, outside_in_read, public_trust_profile), the context is clear enough for an agent to route correctly, though explicit exclusions would push it higher.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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