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tide_security_analysis

Read-only

Analyze an EXISTING (possibly non-Tide) system for security gaps and map them to Tide capabilities. Returns the Security Analyst role instructions, the security gap mapping table (SG-01…SG-18), and the runtime-probe procedures. Use this when the user asks 'do a security analysis', 'where is my auth weak', or 'what would Tide change about my security'.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "tide_security_analysis"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
partNoWhich part to return when the document is delivered in several parts. Omit for part 1; the response says how many there are.
include_runtime_probesNoInclude the runtime-confirmation probe procedures (canon/security-runtime-probes.md). Only relevant when the operator is authorized to probe a live target. Defaults to true.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • addedInput schema / properties / part / maximum
      Added value: +9007199254740991
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / part
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Which part to return when the document is delivered in several parts. Omit for part 1; the response says how many there are.",
      +  "minimum": 1,
      +  "type": "integer"
      +}
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false, so the description adds value by disclosing the return payload shape (three distinct artifacts) and by surfacing that runtime probes target a live system and require authorization. A residual ambiguity remains between 'analyze' (implying the tool performs the analysis) and the fact that it returns role instructions for the agent to execute.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the scope/behavior and ending with trigger phrases — no filler. Minor redundancy between the 'runtime-probe procedures' mention in the returns list and the dedicated `include_runtime_probes` parameter.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description correctly carries the burden by naming what comes back and why it is multi-part. For a two-optional-parameter read tool with full annotation coverage, this is nearly complete; only the ambiguity about whether the tool executes analysis or returns instructions to run is unresolved.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both `part` and `include_runtime_probes` are fully documented in structured data; the description only alludes to the runtime-probe artifact without adding format or defaulting detail. Baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — analyze an EXISTING (possibly non-Tide) system for security gaps and map them to Tide capabilities — and then enumerates the three artifacts returned (role instructions, SG-01…SG-18 mapping table, runtime-probe procedures). The 'EXISTING (possibly non-Tide)' qualifier distinguishes it from Tide-internal gap siblings like tide_gaps.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit trigger phrases ('do a security analysis', 'where is my auth weak', 'what would Tide change about my security'), which is strong routing guidance. It does not name any alternative tool or state when to prefer a sibling (e.g. tide_gaps), so the exclusion half of the guidance is absent.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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