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tide_security_analysis

Read-only

Analyze an EXISTING (possibly non-Tide) system for security gaps and map them to Tide capabilities. Returns the Security Analyst role instructions, the security gap mapping table (SG-01…SG-18), and the runtime-probe procedures. Use this when the user asks 'do a security analysis', 'where is my auth weak', or 'what would Tide change about my security'.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
partNoWhich part to return when the document is delivered in several parts. Omit for part 1; the response says how many there are.
include_runtime_probesNoInclude the runtime-confirmation probe procedures (canon/security-runtime-probes.md). Only relevant when the operator is authorized to probe a live target. Defaults to true.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / part
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Which part to return when the document is delivered in several parts. Omit for part 1; the response says how many there are.",
      +  "minimum": 1,
      +  "type": "integer"
      +}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false. The description adds value beyond that by disclosing the return payload (Security Analyst instructions, SG-01…SG-18 gap table, runtime-probe procedures) and the schema param notes the authorization caveat for live probing. This is solid behavioral context for a read-only analysis tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the core action and then the returned artifacts and trigger phrases. The capitalization of 'EXISTING' usefully emphasizes scope. Slightly dense but every sentence earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description appropriately summarizes return content (role instructions, gap table, probe procedures). Parameters are fully covered by the schema and safety is covered by annotations. Complete for a read-only analysis tool, with only minor room to clarify sibling routing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already fully documents 'part' and 'include_runtime_probes', including the part-1 default and the authorization condition. The description adds little beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (analyze an existing system for security gaps, map to Tide capabilities) and clarifies scope with 'EXISTING (possibly non-Tide)'. It also names the concrete artifacts returned. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from close siblings like tide_gaps or tide_blast_radius, so differentiation is only implicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit trigger phrases ('do a security analysis', 'where is my auth weak', 'what would Tide change about my security') that make the when-to-use condition clear. However, it names no alternative tool or when-not-to-use condition, so routing among the many tide_* siblings still requires inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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