Return the secure context evidence API and release contract.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | No | ||
| channel_id | No | ||
| artifact_id | No | ||
| endpoint_id | No | ||
| object_type_id | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry the burden. It only says 'Return', implying read-only, but does not disclose how the five parameters affect the output, whether there are side effects, or any constraints. Minimal behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single sentence with no wasted words. It is concise, though the brevity sacrifices necessary detail. Structurally it is direct and front-loaded with the action.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema, the description fails to explain parameter usage, the nature of the 'evidence API and release contract', or how to select this tool among siblings. With five parameters and zero schema coverage, this is inadequate.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate for the five undocumented parameters. It does not mention status, channel_id, artifact_id, endpoint_id, or object_type_id at all, leaving the agent without any meaning beyond their names.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a clear verb 'Return' and a resource 'secure context evidence API and release contract', but the resource is vague and does not differentiate from many sibling secure_context_* tools. It is not a tautology but lacks specific scope or distinction.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance on when to use this tool versus siblings like recipes_secure_context_attestation_pack or recipes_secure_context_trust_pack. The description does not mention any context, prerequisites, or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.