Return OWASP MCP and agentic-skill risk coverage mapped to generated evidence.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | No | ||
| risk_id | No | ||
| risk_tier | No | ||
| source_id | No | ||
| standard_id | No | ||
| capability_id | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It states only that the tool returns a mapping, giving no information about filtering behavior, default handling of the six optional parameters, whether results are restricted by status or risk tier, or what 'generated evidence' refers to. The read-only nature is implied by 'Return' but never confirmed or elaborated.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is short, which is good, but it is under-specified rather than deliberately concise. The single sentence earns its place as a purpose statement but omits necessary guidance. There is no structure or additional detail that would help an agent use the tool effectively.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema, the description fails to explain the tool's six completely undocumented parameters, the meaning of 'generated evidence,' or how to interpret the risk coverage results. Given the breadth of sibling tools and the lack of any annotation or schema descriptions, this description is far too thin for reliable tool selection and invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, with six optional parameters (status, risk_id, risk_tier, source_id, standard_id, capability_id) and no descriptions in the schema. The description does not explain what any parameter means, how they filter the coverage mapping, or how they combine. This is a significant gap that the description makes no attempt to fill.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb ('Return') and resource ('OWASP MCP and agentic-skill risk coverage mapped to generated evidence'), making the core purpose understandable. It does not sharply differentiate this tool from the many sibling risk/pack tools, but the 'OWASP' and 'generated evidence' qualifiers provide meaningful context.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is given on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as recipes_mcp_tool_risk_contract or recipes_agentic_assurance_pack. There are no stated conditions, exclusions, or sibling references, leaving the agent to infer usage from the name and one-line description alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.