Heuristic matcher that suggests best-fit recipes for a security finding.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| facets | No | ||
| package | No | ||
| rule_id | No | ||
| keywords | No | ||
| ecosystem | No | ||
| min_quality | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description bears the full burden. 'Heuristic' and 'best-fit' disclose approximate behavior, but the description does not explain ranking, quality thresholds, empty results, or how the multiple criteria combine.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The one-sentence description is free of filler and front-loads the core notion. However, it is under-specified rather than appropriately sized, so the brevity reduces overall usefulness.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has no annotations, 8 optional parameters, and no parameter documentation, and the description does not fill that gap. It lacks when-to-use guidance, behavioral details, and any parameter semantics needed to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description names none of the 8 parameters. An agent must guess the meaning and format of cve, package, facets, rule_id, keywords, ecosystem, min_quality, and limit.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a clear action ('suggests best-fit recipes') and target domain ('security finding'), with 'heuristic' signaling approximate matching. The name distinguishes it from the many other recipes_* tools, though it does not explicitly compare itself to siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is given on when to choose this matcher over sibling tools such as recipes_cve_get, recipes_cve_search, or recipes_search. The 'match_finding' verb implies a use case, but conditions and exclusions are left unstated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.