Search every in-scope Medium/High/Critical CVE; use recipes_cve_get for complete details.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| query | Yes | ||
| kev_only | No | ||
| severity | No | ||
| published_year | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description must carry behavioral disclosure. It communicates that this is a search operation returning CVE matches rather than full details, and it notes severity scope. However, it does not address pagination, default limits, filtering semantics, or read-only assurance, so the behavioral burden is only partially met.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single sentence front-loads the action and immediately names the relevant sibling for detail retrieval. There is no filler, though the brevity leaves no room for parameter or usage detail.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having an output schema, the definition is incomplete for a 5-parameter search tool with zero schema documentation. It omits all parameter semantics and contextual guidance, leaving an agent to guess how to construct a query or when to use filters.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description explains none of the five parameters (query, limit, kev_only, severity, published_year). It neither states what each parameter controls nor offers any query syntax or filter guidance.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Search') and a clearly bounded resource ('every in-scope Medium/High/Critical CVE'), and it explicitly routes to recipes_cve_get for complete details, distinguishing it from the sibling getter. An agent can tell this search tool apart from related CVE tools without opening schemas.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives a clear usage context: use for searching the CVE set, and defer to recipes_cve_get when complete details are needed. It does not list explicit exclusions or advanced conditions, but the sibling routing is enough for basic tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.