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recipes_agentic_exposure_graph

Return risk-ranked agentic exposure paths across context, identities, MCP tools, and evidence.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
node_idNo
path_idNo
decisionNo
namespaceNo
identity_idNo
workflow_idNo
minimum_scoreNo
path_class_idNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

C2.7/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It does convey a read-only query behavior and an ordering trait ('risk-ranked'), which is meaningful. However, it does not disclose how ranking works, how the optional filters interact, or whether traversal or performance constraints apply.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is one front-loaded sentence with no filler, and the core action appears first. It is appropriately concise, though the heavy use of jargon like 'agentic exposure paths' slightly reduces clarity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The output schema reduces the need to describe return values, and the description gives a general sense of the result. Still, with 8 optional but undocumented parameters and no annotations, this is insufficient for reliable invocation; an agent cannot determine what values to supply or when this tool is the right choice.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters1/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the description does not explain any of the eight parameters, including cryptic ones like path_id, decision, node_id, or path_class_id. The phrase 'identities' loosely maps to identity_id at best, but most parameters remain entirely unexplained.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb ('Return'), a resource ('agentic exposure paths'), and useful qualifiers ('risk-ranked', across context, identities, MCP tools, and evidence). It clearly communicates what the tool produces, though it does not explicitly differentiate it from related sibling tools like recipes_agentic_threat_radar or recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance is given for when to use this tool versus the many related sibling tools. There are no prerequisites, exclusions, or alternative tool names mentioned, so an agent must infer selection context entirely from the tool name.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.2/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.

Naming Consistency3/5

All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.

Tool Count1/5

Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.

Completeness4/5

The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.