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Prepare outbound invitation

prepare_outbound_invitation

Known target: prepare a local invitation. No target: agent_collaboration_request. Human review: human_bridge_request. It does not send.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
targetYesHTTPS target URL. Private/local targets are rejected.
agentIdNoOptional public-safe agent identifier. When supplied it is bound into the exact action digest.
messageYesPublic-safe invitation text; no secrets or personal data.
permissionBasisYesDocumented basis for preparing the candidate.
operatorOrganizationIdentifierNoOptional public-safe operator/organization identifier; do not send personal data.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / examples
      Previous value: -[
      -  {
      -    "message": "Public interoperability invitation.",
      -    "permissionBasis": "public_machine_endpoint",
      -    "target": "https://example.org/a2a"
      -  }
      -]New value: +[
      +  {
      +    "agentId": "agent-example-01",
      +    "message": "Public interoperability invitation.",
      +    "permissionBasis": "public_machine_endpoint",
      +    "target": "https://example.org/a2a"
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / agentId
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional public-safe agent identifier. When supplied it is bound into the exact action digest.",
      +  "maxLength": 128,
      +  "minLength": 1,
      +  "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / operatorOrganizationIdentifier
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional public-safe operator/organization identifier; do not send personal data.",
      +  "maxLength": 128,
      +  "minLength": 1,
      +  "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. Changed10 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / examples
      Added value: +[
      +  {
      +    "message": "Public interoperability invitation.",
      +    "permissionBasis": "public_machine_endpoint",
      +    "target": "https://example.org/a2a"
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / message / description
      Added value: +"Public-safe invitation text; no secrets or personal data."
    • addedInput schema / properties / message / maxLength
      Added value: +1500
    • addedInput schema / properties / message / minLength
      Added value: +1
    • addedInput schema / properties / permissionBasis / description
      Added value: +"Documented basis for preparing the candidate."
    • addedInput schema / properties / target / description
      Added value: +"HTTPS target URL. Private/local targets are rejected."
    • addedInput schema / properties / target / format
      Added value: +"uri"
    • addedInput schema / properties / target / maxLength
      Added value: +2048
    • addedInput schema / properties / target / minLength
      Added value: +9
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "description": "Structured JSON result returned in structuredContent.",
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  3. Added

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare non-read-only, non-destructive, non-idempotent, closed-world, but say nothing about transmission. The sentence 'It does not send' adds a materially important behavioral fact beyond the annotations, though it omits side effects, the rejection of private/local targets, and any auth expectations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Roughly twenty words with no padding, and the routing facts are front-loaded. The fragmentary colon-clause style is compact but slightly cryptic, keeping it short of ideal clarity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema, full parameter descriptions, and annotations present, the description only needs to add routing and non-sending semantics, which it does. A note on why permissionBasis must be documented or what 'prepare' yields would have closed the remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all five parameters are already documented, including the enum for permissionBasis and the digest-binding behavior of agentId. The description adds no parameter-level meaning, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific action (prepare) and output (a local invitation), and separates itself from siblings by routing 'known target' cases here. However, 'local invitation' is left unexplained and the phrasing is telegraphic, so the agent gets the verb and resource but not a plain statement of what the tool produces.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit selection conditions against two named alternatives: no target routes to agent_collaboration_request, human review routes to human_bridge_request. That is genuine when-to-use guidance, though no prerequisites (e.g. permissionBasis requirements) or when-not-to-use cases are stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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