Skip to main content
Glama

tascan_set_access

Idempotent

Set the security level of a task list (list_id) or a task (task_id): access_level (open, assigned, secured or null), human_assignees (worker ids, lists only) and agent_assignee (an agent_id of your org, or null; lists only: a task follows its list and refuses it as task_agent_assignee_unsupported). Raising it needs any write key that can see the item; lowering it or removing an assignee needs an owner/admin-tier key (an agent key is refused lower_requires_admin); a Decisions list or a passkey card never goes below assigned. The change and its access_changed ledger event are one transaction (all or nothing); access_conflict when the item changed meanwhile. Write tier.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
list_idNo
task_idNo
access_levelNo
agent_assigneeNoLists only: the agent_id whose key alone may reach the list and every task on it, or null
human_assigneesNoLists only: the full set of assigned worker ids (replaces the current set)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=true. The description adds substantial context beyond that: permission tiers for raising vs. lowering, agent-key refusal (lower_requires_admin), the Decisions/passkey floor at assigned, atomic transaction with the access_changed ledger event, and access_conflict on concurrent change. However, it says human_assignees 'replaces the current set', which quietly removes existing assignees while annotations assert destructiveHint=false – a tension worth noting, though not a direct contradiction of a stated behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the operation, then layers constraints and error codes with no filler. It is dense but every clause carries operational meaning; slightly long for a single block but well ordered.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the full burden and does: it covers the permission model, entity scoping, error conditions (task_agent_assignee_unsupported, lower_requires_admin, access_conflict), and transaction semantics. An agent has what it needs to call this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 40%, but the description compensates well: it names list_id and task_id, lists the access_level enum values (open/assigned/secured/null), and clarifies that human_assignees and agent_assignee are list-scoped. It does not state that exactly one of list_id/task_id must be supplied, which is the main remaining ambiguity.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (set access level of a task list or task), names both target ids, and enumerates the access levels. An agent immediately knows this is the security-level mutation tool, distinct from read-side siblings like tascan_get_access.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Clear about when each mode applies: human_assignees and agent_assignee are 'lists only', and a task 'follows its list and refuses it as task_agent_assignee_unsupported'. It does not, however, name alternatives (e.g. use tascan_get_access to inspect first) or give explicit when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.