Independently verify a CausalCertificate end-to-end (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status against the registry). Cost: 1 credit. In production env, certificates from non-active issuers are rejected.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| certificate | Yes | CausalCertificateV1 object as returned by submit_incident.certificate |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Discloses cost (1 credit) and environment-specific behavior (rejection of non-active issuers in production). With no annotations, the description provides useful behavioral context beyond the schema, though it doesn't state whether the operation is read-only or modifies state.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three efficient sentences, front-loaded with purpose, followed by cost and environment detail. No unnecessary words; every sentence adds value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Lacks description of return value or output structure. With no output schema, the agent needs to know what the tool returns (e.g., boolean, status object). The description omits this, reducing completeness for a verification tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, but the description adds provenance ('as returned by submit_incident.certificate'), which clarifies the expected source of the certificate object and aids correct usage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Clearly states the verb 'verify' and the resource 'CausalCertificate,' listing the verification aspects (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status). The mention of 'end-to-end' distinguishes it from the sibling verify_certificate_recompute.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Implies use for comprehensive verification, cost of 1 credit, and production rejection of non-active issuers. However, no explicit guidance on when to use this tool vs the sibling verify_certificate_recompute, or when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool targets a distinct operation: prospective gate, incident extraction, anchor status, issuer registry, jurisdiction overlay, remediation simulation, incident submission (two variants), and certificate verification (two variants). Despite two submission and two verification tools, their descriptions clearly differentiate the inputs and purposes, preventing ambiguity.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern in snake_case (e.g., evaluate_prospective_response, submit_incident, verify_certificate). The verbs are descriptive and the nouns correspond to the domain objects, making the naming predictable and clear.
With 10 tools, the server covers a complex domain (causal liability attribution for AI incidents) without being overwhelming. Each tool serves a distinct role in the workflow, and the count feels well-scoped for the functionality offered.
The tool set covers the core lifecycle: extraction, submission (structured and trace-based), verification (standard and recompute), a prospective gate, jurisdiction query, remediation simulation, and infrastructure queries (anchor, registry). Minor gaps exist, such as no tool to list or search past incidents/certificates, but the essential operations are present.
