Independently verify a CausalCertificate end-to-end (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status against the registry). Cost: 1 credit. In production env, certificates from non-active issuers are rejected.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| certificate | Yes | CausalCertificateV1 object as returned by submit_incident.certificate |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It adds valuable context: a cost of 1 credit and production-environment rejection for certificates from non-active issuers. However, it does not explain side effects (if any), return format, or failure modes beyond issuer rejection.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two compact sentences: the first declares the core action and scope, the second adds cost and production-specific behavior. No fluff or repetition; information is front-loaded and efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers purpose, cost, and a key environmental behavior, but it does not describe the output/return value, and there is no output schema to fill that gap. Given the complexity of 'end-to-end' verification, an agent would benefit from knowing what the tool returns (e.g., success status, report, reasons for failure).
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% and the parameter description ('CausalCertificateV1 object as returned by submit_incident.certificate') is explicit and helpful. The tool description does not add further detail beyond echoing the certificate object, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool verifies a CausalCertificate end-to-end, listing specific verification dimensions (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status). This specific verb+resource+scope distinguishes it from siblings like verify_certificate_recompute, which likely has a narrower focus.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies use for independent verification and mentions production behavior, but it does not explicitly state when to choose this tool over alternatives such as verify_certificate_recompute or query_issuer_registry. No exclusions or alternative comparisons are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have distinct purposes, but submit_incident and submit_otel_trace both create certificates from different input sources, and verify_certificate and verify_certificate_recompute both verify but via different methods. Descriptions and input types make them distinguishable, so ambiguity is low.
All names use snake_case and generally follow a verb_noun pattern (e.g., submit_incident, verify_certificate). Deviations like verify_certificate_recompute (verb_noun_modifier) and evaluate_prospective_response (verb_adjective_noun) are minor and remain predictable.
10 tools is well within the ideal 3-15 range and maps cleanly to the domain: incident submission, text extraction, pre-response gating, certificate verification, remediation simulation, jurisdiction analysis, and issuer/anchor metadata queries. Each tool serves a distinct workflow step without redundancy.
The core lifecycle (extract → submit → verify → analyze) is well covered. However, several tools reference external catalog endpoints (e.g., /jurisdiction/catalog, /remediation/catalog, /gate/thresholds) that are not exposed as MCP tools, forcing an agent to make separate HTTP calls to use these tools effectively. This is a minor workaround, not a critical gap.