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Skysay

Place an outbound call

create_outbound_call
Destructive

Create a policy-gated outbound call request. purpose is required and free-form (see the purpose property description for the advisory catalog); recipient_type is optional and recorded, never enforced; destination country is authorized against the org's workspace capabilities.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toYes
policyNo
purposeYesRequired, free-form outbound purpose declaration -- never refused for being novel. Any non-empty token is accepted; the documented advisory catalog is: appointment, booking_confirmation, callback_requested, customer_outreach, delivery_notification, ops_alert, other, payment_reminder, personal_errand, reservation, status_check, support.
agent_idNo
categoriesNo
project_idYes
campaign_idNo
relationshipNo
from_number_idYes
recipient_typeNoOptional, never enforced or required -- outbound is not restricted to business recipients. Persisted verbatim on the call row if sent; SMS has no recipient_type column, so it is accepted but not stored there.
runtime_configNo
user_requestedNo
organization_idNoOptional. Defaults to the authenticated workspace; when supplied it must be that workspace's id.
agent_endpoint_idNo
user_authorizationYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare the mutation profile (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false). The description adds genuine value beyond that: it discloses that purpose is never refused, that recipient_type is recorded but never enforced, and that the destination is gated by org capabilities. It still stops short of explaining the destructive consequence (call placement) or idempotency behaviour.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the core action and with zero filler. It packs several distinct behavioural facts without padding, though the semicolon-chain of the trailing clause is slightly dense.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 15-parameter, nested-object mutation tool with no output schema, the description is only partially sufficient: it adequately covers the policy gate and two salient parameters, but leaves most inputs and the overall calling workflow underspecified given the low schema coverage.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 20% across 15 parameters. The description adds real meaning for purpose (free-form, never refused) and recipient_type (persisted verbatim, not enforced), but then defers to the schema for the catalog rather than restating it, and leaves the majority of parameters (to, from_number_id, project_id, user_authorization, policy, agent_id, etc.) undocumented in either place.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb + resource ('Create a policy-gated outbound call request'), which is clearly distinct from a plain 'place call'. However, it does not explicitly differentiate itself from neighbouring authorizers such as authorize_outbound or evaluate_outbound_policy, so an agent must still infer which one to choose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'policy-gated' framing and the note that the destination country is authorized against workspace capabilities imply a prerequisite workflow, which is useful contextual guidance. But there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not, and no named alternative for the authorization or policy-evaluation steps.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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