Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint and destructiveHint, and the description's read-only sentence largely restates them. However, it earns credit by disclosing the return shape (AML score 0-100, risk_level, category, sanctioned exposure, source-of-funds) in the absence of any output schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the purpose and closing on output fields. The read-only clause is slightly redundant against the annotations but is short and harmless.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema and only two required params, the description covers both the operation and the key return values, which is most of what an agent needs. It could still note supported chains or error behavior, but the schema already carries the chain enum.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with both parameters and the chain enum fully documented in the schema, so the description adds no syntax or format detail beyond it. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Screen a crypto wallet address for AML/KYT risk') and enumerates what it returns. The address-level scope implicitly separates it from the sibling screen_transaction, so an agent can route correctly without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the AML/KYT framing, but the description never says when to pick this over screen_transaction or trace_source_of_funds, nor does it state prerequisites or exclusions. Adequate but with a clear routing gap.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.