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workspace_member_remove

DestructiveIdempotent

Remove a person from the active workspace (or one named by workspace_id), and revoke the channel shares they had granted into it. Requires owner or admin role. Name them by email, username or numeric user id — workspace.members lists them. The workspace owner cannot be removed.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
memberYesWho to remove: a member's email, username, or numeric user id. Call workspace.members to see who is in the workspace.
in_workspaceNoRun this one call in this workspace id instead of the session's. Nothing is stored; other sessions are not affected.
workspace_idNoNumeric workspace id. Omit to target the currently-routed workspace (workspace.current).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / in_workspace
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Run this one call in this workspace id instead of the session's. Nothing is stored; other sessions are not affected.",
      +  "type": "integer"
      +}
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, and the description still adds substantive behavior beyond them: the removal also revokes channel shares the member granted, it is permission-gated to owner/admin, and the owner is an unremovable exception. That is exactly the cascade and authorization context an agent needs before firing a destructive call.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three dense sentences: action and effect first, then the permission prerequisite, then the identifier guidance and the owner exception. No filler, nothing buried.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, idempotent membership mutation with a fully documented 3-param schema and no output schema, the description covers effect, cascade, authorization, target identification, and the one unremovable case. Nothing material is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema already documents `member`, `in_workspace`, and `workspace_id` in similar terms. The description restates the accepted identifier forms (email, username, numeric id) without adding syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb + resource ('Remove a person from the active workspace') plus scope clarifier (default workspace or one named by `workspace_id`) and the cascading effect on channel shares. An agent can distinguish this from workspace_member_update and workspace_invite_revoke without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives real preconditions: requires owner or admin role, the target must be named by email/username/numeric id, workspace.members is the discovery surface, and the workspace owner cannot be removed. It lacks an explicit 'to change role or modify a member instead, use workspace_member_update' routing statement, which is the only remaining gap.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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