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agents_set_integration

Enable or disable a connected workspace integration on an AI agent — this controls which ext_ integration tools the agent (and its sandboxed workbench runs) may call. Use integrations_list to get the workspace_integration_id.

When enabling with no explicit denied_tools, WRITE-class tools are auto-disabled by default (read tools stay on); pass denied_tools=[] to force-allow everything, or a list of ext slugs / bare tool names to block specific ones. Idempotent upsert — safe to call repeatedly.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
enabledNoTrue to enable the integration on this agent, False to disable
agent_idYesID of the agent to configure
denied_toolsNoOptional explicit block-list of tool names to deny (ext slugs or bare names). Omit to auto-deny WRITE-class tools on first enable; pass [] to allow all.
in_workspaceNoRun this one call in this workspace id instead of the session's. Nothing is stored; other sessions are not affected.
workspace_integration_idYesID of the connected integration (from integrations_list)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / in_workspace
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Run this one call in this workspace id instead of the session's. Nothing is stored; other sessions are not affected.",
      +  "type": "integer"
      +}
  2. Added
  3. Removed
  4. Added

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description claims "Idempotent upsert — safe to call repeatedly," but the annotations declare idempotentHint=false, a direct conflict on the tool's most safety-relevant property. The claim is also internally strained by the schema's own "on first enable" caveat, so an agent relying on it could misjudge whether re-calling changes write-tool exposure. This is an annotation contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short paragraphs, front-loaded with the purpose and effect, then the default-block behavior and the idempotency note. The only mildly redundant sentence is the integrations_list pointer, which also duplicates the schema, but nothing else is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

It covers purpose, the sibling needed to obtain the required ID, the default WRITE-tool blocking, and the ephemerality of in_workspace (also in schema), which is good coverage for a config-mutating tool with no output schema. However, it omits any permission/authorization requirements for changing agent configuration and its idempotency claim is misleading, leaving an agent with a false model of repeat-call behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter including denied_tools and in_workspace is already documented in the schema. The description reinforces the non-obvious denied_tools default (auto-deny WRITE-class tools on enable) but adds no new syntax, format, or interaction detail beyond what the schema states, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ("Enable or disable a connected workspace integration on an AI agent") and immediately scopes the effect to which ext<id>_<name> tools the agent and its sandboxed workbench runs may call. This clearly separates it from siblings like agents_list_integrations (which reads) and integrations_list (which resolves IDs), so an agent can route without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It routes the agent to a specific sibling for prerequisite data ("Use integrations_list to get the workspace_integration_id") and spells out the when-to-use branches for denied_tools (omit for auto-deny of WRITE tools, [] to force-allow, list to block specific ones). What is missing is any explicit when-not-to-use guidance or a note about which sibling to call instead when the goal is merely inspecting the current integration state.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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