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osc-bridge

report_result

Idempotent

Tell the catalogue how a driver behaved on a real device, after testing it: 'works', 'fails' or 'partial', for the whole driver or one OSC address (from list_routes). Give the firmware version, and the device's reply to the MIDI Identity Request (F0 7E 7F 06 01 F7) as identity_hex when you can: trust is counted per firmware, so a failure on another firmware does not count against the driver, and a report of unknown firmware cannot be placed. Several accounts that agree on one firmware mark the driver usage-verified there; a report that several others contradict is rolled back and puts its account under review. Report only what was actually tested.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
noteNoWhat happened, briefly (500 characters at most): wrong range, no effect, other parameter moved…
deviceYesDriver id (e.g. 'korg/minilogue') or slug, from list_devices.
addressNoOne OSC address of the driver (e.g. '/minilogue/filter/cutoff'); omit to report on the whole driver.
outcomeYes
user_idNoYour anonymous osc-bridge id, if you kept it from an earlier session (see the server instructions). Optional.
firmwareNoFirmware version of the tested device.
identity_hexNoThe device's reply to the MIDI Identity Request, in hex (e.g. 'F0 7E 00 06 02 42 2C 01 00 00 02 01 00 00 F7'). Proves the device was connected and carries its firmware version.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
trustYesThe driver's trust after this report (see get_trust).
reportYesThe report's id.
statusYesaccepted: counts in the trust; pending: the account is under review; rolled-back: other accounts contradict it on this firmware.
recordedYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Well beyond the annotations, it discloses consequences: trust is counted per firmware, several agreeing accounts mark the driver usage-verified, and contradicted reports are rolled back and put the account under review. That is exactly the kind of mutation side-effect disclosure annotations cannot convey. What it doesn't cover is whether a re-report by the same account overwrites the earlier one (despite idempotentHint=true) or any rate limiting.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action, outcome vocabulary and scope before the trust mechanics, and every clause carries information. It is a single dense, run-on paragraph where the trust/review consequences could be tightened into shorter sentences.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

A mutation tool whose annotations are safety-only, but the description supplies the missing incentive and moderation context, and an output schema exists so return values need no explanation. Minor gaps remain around correcting or superseding a prior report and whether repeated submissions are rate-limited.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 86% schema coverage the schema already documents most fields, yet the description adds real semantics: firmware is the unit of trust accounting so a report without it 'cannot be placed', and identity_hex is framed as proof of connection that also carries firmware. Outcome values are restated but that is already an enum; note and user_id are not discussed.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('Tell the catalogue how a driver behaved on a real device') plus the exact outcome vocabulary and the scope choice (whole driver vs. a single OSC address). It does not explicitly differentiate itself from the similarly-named sibling report_mapping or submit_fix, so an agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It clearly conditions use on having actually tested on hardware ('after testing it', 'Report only what was actually tested') and points to list_routes/list_devices for the identifier values. It states no explicit when-not or naming an alternative tool, so the boundary against report_mapping is left implicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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