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Glama

federation_key_status

Read-onlyIdempotent

Read a manager root's bound public key — the public machine-legible fact (CO 314): public_key, alg, kid, bound_at. A counterparty verifies this root's signatures against it. Includes the tamper-evident attestation chain's current head (CO 324); full chain + verification rule at /.well-known/key-attestation-chain. Omit manager_id to read your own. Never returns any challenge or secret. Returns: { public_key, alg, kid, bound_at } + the attestation chain head. Never a challenge or secret. Example: call federation_key_status with arguments {}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
manager_idNoThe root to read; defaults to the caller.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / manager_id / maxLength
      Added value: +4000
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint and destructiveHint annotations, the description adds specific behavioral guarantees: never returns a challenge or secret, includes the attestation chain head, and points to the full chain URL. This is valuable context that annotations do not cover. No contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-organized and front-loaded, but it repeats 'Never returns any challenge or secret' twice, adding slight redundancy. Otherwise, every sentence serves a purpose and the structure is logical.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only tool with one optional parameter and no output schema, the description fully specifies return fields, usage semantics, security guarantees, and a related well-known resource. It provides an example and covers all necessary context for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already describes manager_id as 'defaults to the caller.' The description reinforces this with 'Omit manager_id to read your own' and adds an example with empty arguments. With 100% schema coverage, the description adds minimal new semantic detail, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool reads a manager root's bound public key and lists the specific fields (public_key, alg, kid, bound_at). It also distinguishes itself from sibling tools like federation_key_bind (which binds keys) and federation_key_challenge (which likely involves secrets) by emphasizing read-only and never returning a challenge or secret.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides context: a counterparty verifies signatures, and you can omit manager_id to read your own key. It also hints at alternative resources (full attestation chain at well-known URL). However, it does not explicitly name alternative tools or state when not to use it, though the 'never returns any challenge or secret' clue differentiates it from key_challenge.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Tools are grouped by clear domain prefixes (federation_*, introspection_*, moltbook_*) with each targeting a distinct resource+action (bond_post/release/status, key_challenge/bind/status, journal_append/read). The primary near-overlap — catalog_search_multi vs catalog_search_grouped_multi — is explicitly disambiguated in descriptions. Minor confusion risk exists among the four knowledge tools (federation_help, federation_why, about_us_about, how_to_about) but their purposes (how/why/manual/walkthrough) are distinct enough.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant `federation_<verb>_<noun>` pattern (create_tenant, list_agents, bond_release) is strong, but it's mixed with bare-noun tools (federation_arena, federation_offer, federation_solvency, federation_pricesheet, federation_help) and noun-noun variants (federation_manager_tree, federation_tenant_info). Non-federation tools use a loose `<domain>_<verb>` or single-token convention (legal_get, web_research, about_us_about). Readable overall, but conventions are noticeably mixed across the surface.

Tool Count2/5

At 72 tools this crosses the 50+ threshold for an extreme count. While the federation's scope is genuinely broad (manager lifecycle, tenants, catalog, agents, bonds, keys, journal, canon, introspection, social, email, research), the surface is bloated — roughly 15 bare introspection tools (list_nodes, probe, confidence, diff, coverage_gaps, co_decisions, climb_history, change_graph, change_reach, corpus_*) cover meta-self-knowledge that could plausibly collapse into fewer verbs. Agents would face a very large selection space.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface is exhaustively complete for the federation domain: applicant and operator sides of admittance, full manager lifecycle (create/list/freeze/attest/bond/key), full tenant lifecycle (create/list/info/update/suspend/delete/enter), catalog discovery with change-detection, pricing, solvency, latency, journaling, governance, legal, and even external outreach (email/moltbook/research). No dead ends exist — every write has a corresponding read/status path, and branched platform tools are intentionally deferred behind enter_tenant rather than omitted.

Resources