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federation_node_report_in

The mothership link (CO 486): a self-hosted node reports in to the hub on its own initiative (poll-shaped, node-initiated — the hub never calls the node). NODE-SIGNED, not operator-token'd: the node's identity IS its signature over the canonical envelope { node_id, nonce, timestamp, route }, verified against its bound key (federation_node_key_bind). Carries version, catalog digest, and journal head; advances the node's liveness clock (minutes), which is separate from the operator's manager standing (days) — a dark node never accelerates its operator's decay. Fails closed on a bad/absent/replayed signature or a stale timestamp. No operator token required; the signature is the auth. Returns: { ok: true, last_report_in, report_in_count } or { error, code }. Example: call federation_node_report_in with arguments {}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
algYesSignature algorithm of the bound key.
nonceYesA fresh single-use nonce (part of the signed envelope).
node_idYesThe reporting node.
versionNoThe node runtime version.
signatureYesbase64 signature over the canonical envelope, by the node bound key.
timestampYesISO timestamp, within the accepted skew window (part of the signed envelope).
journal_headNoThe node journal head (git commit hash) for hub attestation.
catalog_digestNoCompact digest of the node catalog subtree.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only say readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=false; the description provides substantial extra behavior: it advances the node's liveness clock separately from operator standing, fails closed on bad/absent/replayed signatures or stale timestamps, and describes both success and error returns. This goes far beyond the structured annotation data.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded and dense with important information, but it is written as one long paragraph with a cryptic 'CO 486' reference and an example that says to call with arguments {} despite five required parameters. That example is misleading and the overall structure could be more scannable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a security-sensitive tool with no output schema, the description is complete: it covers auth expectations, side effects, failure modes, and both success and error return shapes. The schema handles parameter vocabulary, while the description covers operational context such as liveness-clock separation and why replay/stale timestamps fail.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all parameters. The description adds value by explaining the canonical signed envelope, the single-use nature of the nonce, timestamp skew, and how the signature and algorithm relate to the bound key. A minor inconsistency is mentioning 'route' in the envelope while no route parameter appears in the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a concrete action: a self-hosted node reports in to the hub on its own initiative, and it immediately disambiguates the interaction model ('the hub never calls the node'). It also clarifies the auth distinction (NODE-SIGNED vs operator-token'd), making the tool's role clear against sibling federation tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear triggering context: node-initiated, poll-shaped reporting where the hub does not initiate, and no operator token is required because the signature is the auth. It does not explicitly name alternatives or provide when-not-to-use exclusions, but the conditions are unambiguous enough for an agent to route correctly.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes with detailed descriptions. A few pairs like federation_catalog_search_multi and federation_catalog_search_grouped_multi could be confused, but descriptions explicitly delineate when to use each. Overall, the boundaries are clear.

Naming Consistency3/5

The federation_* tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern, but many tools use other prefixes (introspection_, moltbook_, llm_, web_, cohort_, legal_, about_us_, how_to_), breaking overall consistency. Within the main federation domain naming is predictable, but across the full set it's mixed.

Tool Count2/5

72 tools is far beyond the typical 3-15 for a coherent set. While the federation scope is broad, the sheer number makes the surface unwieldy and increases the risk of misselection, even if each tool individually earns its place.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers lifecycle management (create/update/delete/suspend tenants), manager operations, agents, catalog search, governance, introspection, legal, and auxiliary functions like email and web research. Platform-specific actions are exposed via federation_enter_tenant, so no critical dead ends are apparent.

Resources