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Issue a signed agent pass

issue_pass

Issue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for. REQUIRES A KEY. Anyone can verify it independently against /.well-known/jwks.json — without calling CAP-Shield again. 'acts_for' and 'scope' are NOT validated against reality: the pass only attests that the key holder claimed this, at this time, and that the claim is recorded in the audit chain. This is identity and claimed authorization, not a payment or access-control mechanism.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "acts_for": "<acts_for>"
    },
    "name": "issue_pass"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeNoOptional, freeform, NOT validated. Example: {"can_read": "invoice_json", "max_budget_usd": 500}.
acts_forYesWho the agent claims to act for, e.g. 'acme-corp/procurement'.
audienceNoOptional. Who the pass is shown to.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=false), the description discloses the 15-minute lifetime, the JWT format, independent verification via /.well-known/jwks.json, and audit-chain recording. Crucially it warns that 'acts_for' and 'scope' are not validated against reality, so the agent knows the credential's trust boundary.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with what the tool produces, then moves to the key requirement, verification path, and caveats in a logical order. The closing sentence partly restates the non-validation warning already given, which is the only wasted weight.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries return-value burden and does so by describing the JWT and its verification endpoint. It omits how the pass is returned or how key provisioning/failures behave, a minor gap for a single-required-parameter tool with full schema coverage.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns above that by adding that 'acts_for' is an unverified claim recorded in the audit chain, information the schema does not state for that parameter. It does not discuss 'audience', which is left entirely to the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource plus its defining properties: 'Issue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for.' No sibling in the list issues passes, and the phrase 'signed agent pass' in the title is expanded rather than restated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It sets a clear precondition ('REQUIRES A KEY') and bounds the use case by stating this is 'not a payment or access-control mechanism,' which tells the agent when not to rely on it. It stops short of naming an alternative tool or describing the workflow step where issuance belongs.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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