Threatfox

Search Malware

search_malware

Read-onlyIdempotent

IOCs tagged to a malware family (e.g., "Cobalt Strike", "Emotet", "QakBot").

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`limit`	No	Max records (default 1000)
`malware`	Yes	Malware family name or MISP alias

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`count`	Yes	Number of results returned
`query`	Yes	The query type sent (malwareinfo)
`status`	Yes	Query status (ok, no_result, or null)
`results`	Yes	IOCs tagged to the malware family

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedMay 22, 2026

addedInput schema / examples

Added value: +[
+  {
+    "malware": "Cobalt Strike"
+  },
+  {
+    "limit": 500,
+    "malware": "Emotet"
+  }
+]

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "properties": {
+    "count": {
+      "description": "Number of results returned",
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "query": {
+      "description": "The query type sent (malwareinfo)",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "results": {
+      "description": "IOCs tagged to the malware family",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "status": {
+      "description": "Query status (ok, no_result, or null)",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "query",
+    "status",
+    "count",
+    "results"
+  ],
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedMay 13, 2026

TDQS

A3.8/5.0

Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false. The description adds no behavioral context beyond the annotations, so it meets the baseline but provides no extra value.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single, front-loaded sentence that immediately conveys the core function. No wasted words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description is sufficient for a simple tool with two parameters and an output schema. It states the result type (IOCs) and example values. Could be more complete by mentioning when to use this over search_ioc.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%: both parameters are described. The description includes examples but doesn't add deeper meaning beyond what the schema provides. Baseline score of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool retrieves IOCs tagged to a specific malware family, with concrete examples. It distinguishes from sibling tools like search_ioc by focusing on malware families.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No explicit guidance on when to use this vs alternatives (e.g., search_ioc). Usage is implied from the description but lacks direct comparison or exclusion criteria.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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