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Glama

biii

by io.github.philpof102-svg

till_resolve

IDENTITY BRIDGE: resolve an AGENT identity — a buzz/Nostr npub (64-hex secp256k1) AND/OR a gitlawb did:key (Ed25519) — to a payable, trust-assessable BASE address, trustlessly. The binding is a BIDIRECTIONAL attestation: each identity key AND the Base key sign the same canonical message, so anyone re-verifies the signatures (BIII never takes your word). A binding needs AT LEAST one identity key (npub or did). Fail-closed: unverified / an identity key missing its signature / expired / un-nonced / malformed ⇒ a CLAIM, not a binding (bound:false). BIII does not verify secp256k1/Ed25519 itself (no dep) — supply verified:true after checking the sigs, or re-verify with the returned pointer. When bound, feed the address to till_trust / till_vet_merchant (resolving is NOT trusting).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
didNothe agent's gitlawb did:key (Ed25519 identity) — provide did and/or npub
npubNothe agent's 64-hex secp256k1 pubkey (Nostr/buzz identity) — provide npub and/or did
nonceNoa per-binding nonce (anti-replay) — required
expiryNooptional unix seconds; 0 = no expiry
sigDidNothe did:key's Ed25519 signature over the canonical message (required if did is present)
addressYesthe claimed Base address (0x…)
chainIdNodefault 8453 (Base)
sigBaseNothe Base key's signature over the canonical message (always required)
sigNostrNothe Nostr key's signature over the canonical message (required if npub is present)
verifiedNoattest that every present signature verified (BIII does not check secp256k1/Ed25519 itself)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully discloses behavioral traits: fail-closed on unverified/missing signatures, that BIII does not verify signatures itself (requires 'verified:true'), bidirectional attestation, and the concept of claims vs. bindings. This is comprehensive and exceeds typical transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long and dense, filled with technical jargon. While every sentence adds value, the verbosity and use of all-caps and parentheticals may slow understanding. It could be more concise without losing essential detail.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complexity (10 parameters, no output schema), the description covers most behavioral aspects, fail-closed logic, and post-resolution guidance. However, it omits details about the return structure (e.g., what properties are returned beyond 'bound:false'), which would be helpful for an agent.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds meaning beyond schema by explaining the relationship between identity keys (did, npub), the anti-replay role of nonce, and that sigBase is always required. It clarifies parameter usage and dependencies, adding significant value.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool resolves an AGENT identity to a payable BASE address, specifying identity types (npub, did:key) and the role of attestations. However, it does not explicitly differentiate from sibling tools that may perform related identity operations, though it hints at downstream tools like till_trust.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides explicit guidance on when to use the tool (e.g., after verifying sigs, feed address to till_trust/till_vet_merchant) and what constitutes a binding versus a claim. It implies alternatives by mentioning downstream tools, but lacks explicit 'when not to use' statements.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.1/5.0
Disambiguation3/5

Many tools have distinct, well-named purposes (vet_agent vs vet_merchant), but there is notable overlap between till_trust and till_vet_merchant (both provide trust verdicts), and till_launch_funder vs till_funder_history are closely related. The descriptions are detailed enough to differentiate, but an agent could still misselect between a few pairs.

Naming Consistency3/5

All tools share the till_ prefix, but the pattern is mixed: some use verb_noun (check_invoice, create_charge, watch_wallet) while others are noun phrases (key_exposure, open_approvals, rug_powers) or bare nouns (floor, trust, roll). This is readable but not predictable, so an agent cannot reliably guess a tool name from a verb.

Tool Count2/5

At 29 tools, this server exceeds the 25+ threshold that signals an overgrown toolkit. Even with a broad domain, many tools are one-off niche scanners (till_b20_authentic, till_floor, till_meter) that inflate the surface and could be consolidated or externalized.

Completeness4/5

The toolkit covers the payment lifecycle comprehensively: create charges/invoices, check payments, verify delivery, generate receipts, rolls, and accounting exports. It also spans identity, trust, security scanning, and theft tracing. Minor gaps exist (no update/cancel for charges, no token-general vetting), but the non-custodial, read-only design makes these acceptable.

Resources