alphapipeline

security.token_risk

Read-only

Use this tool before executing any on-chain swap to verify if an ERC-20 contract is a honeypot, rug-pull risk, or has malicious buy/sell taxes and mintability backdoors. GoPlus/Honeypot.is-backed security audit for a given contract address - beyond is_honeypot, also surfaces individual GoPlus risk signals (cannot_buy, cannot_sell_all, hidden_owner, transfer_pausable, selfdestruct, is_blacklisted, slippage_modifiable, owner_percent) into risk_flags, plus is_proxy/trading_cooldown as informational-only fields (not flagged, since both are common in legitimate contracts). All of these are null when the Honeypot.is fallback path is used. Do not use for market price discovery or liquidity depth. Paid in USDC on Base.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "chain_id": "<chain_id>",
      "contract_address": "<contract_address>"
    },
    "name": "security.token_risk"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`chain_id`	Yes	EVM chain id, e.g. 8453 for Base.
`contract_address`	Yes	Token contract address (0x...).

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`notice`	No
`chain_id`	Yes
`is_proxy`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Informational only - does not feed risk_flags.
`is_in_dex`	No
`cannot_buy`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.
`risk_flags`	Yes
`risk_level`	Yes
`token_name`	No
`buy_tax_pct`	No
`data_source`	Yes
`is_honeypot`	No
`is_mintable`	No
`generated_at`	Yes
`hidden_owner`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.
`holder_count`	No
`selfdestruct`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.
`sell_tax_pct`	No
`token_symbol`	No
`owner_address`	No
`owner_percent`	No	Owner's % of total supply, GoPlus-only. Feeds 'high_owner_concentration' risk_flag at >=50%.
`is_blacklisted`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.
`is_open_source`	No
`cannot_sell_all`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.
`owner_renounced`	No
`contract_address`	Yes
`trading_cooldown`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Informational only - does not feed risk_flags.
`transfer_pausable`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.
`slippage_modifiable`	No	GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed10 schema fields changedSep 18, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / cannot_buy

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / cannot_sell_all

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / hidden_owner

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / is_blacklisted

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / is_proxy

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Informational only - does not feed risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / owner_percent

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Owner's % of total supply, GoPlus-only. Feeds 'high_owner_concentration' risk_flag at >=50%.",
+  "type": [
+    "number",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / selfdestruct

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / slippage_modifiable

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / trading_cooldown

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Informational only - does not feed risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / transfer_pausable

Added value: +{
+  "description": "GoPlus-only, null on Honeypot.is fallback. Feeds risk_flags.",
+  "type": [
+    "boolean",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}

First observedSep 8, 2026

TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint and destructiveHint annotations, the description discloses substantial behavioral details: which GoPlus signals are surfaced as risk_flags, that is_proxy/trading_cooldown are informational-only, that fields become null on the Honeypot.is fallback path, and that there is a cost model ('Paid in USDC on Base'). This is far more transparency than the annotations alone could provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but dense, and each clause adds useful information: usage timing, source, risk signals, fallback behavior, exclusions, and payment. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and then layers supporting details, so it is structured effectively despite its length.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given that the schema fully documents the two parameters and an output schema is present, the description covers the remaining context: when to use it, what signals to expect, fallback behavior, and cost. Nothing necessary for an agent needs to correctly invoke the tool is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Both parameters are already fully described in the input schema with clear descriptions and an example (chain_id, contract_address). The tool description does not add much parameter-level meaning beyond restating that the contract address is an ERC-20 token, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose: verify if an ERC-20 contract is a honeypot, rug-pull risk, or has malicious taxes/mintability backdoors, using GoPlus/Honeypot.is. It is specific and actionable, and the mention of 'beyond is_honeypot' and individual risk signals helps characterize its scope. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from sibling security tools like security.contract_health_audit or security.token_diagnostic.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives a clear when-to-use instruction: 'Use this tool before executing any on-chain swap' and also provides a when-not-to-use constraint: 'Do not use for market price discovery or liquidity depth.' However, it does not name any alternative sibling tools or explain when one of those should be chosen instead.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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