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Check a challenge signature

verify_challenge

Use after create_challenge, when the other party returns a signature. Free. Checks the signature (BIP-322 simple/full or legacy sign-message) against the address that holds the name right now. Returns valid true/false and, on failure, a code: bad_signature, not_holder, holder_changed, expired or already_used. Each challenge can pass once. A pass proves the signer controls the wallet holding the name at that moment, not legal identity.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "challenge_id": "<challenge_id>",
      "signature": "<signature>"
    },
    "name": "verify_challenge"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
addressNoOptional: the address they say signed it.
signatureYesBase64 signature of the exact message.
challenge_idYeschallenge_id from create_challenge.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only say readOnlyHint=false/openWorld=true; the description adds the crucial behavioral facts the agent could not infer: the challenge is single-use ('Each challenge can pass once'), the exact failure code vocabulary, that the call is free, and the epistemic limit of a pass (wallet control, not legal identity). It also implicitly explains why readOnlyHint is false despite the 'check' framing.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the usage condition, then the verification mechanics, then the outputs, then the semantic caveat. Every sentence carries distinct information; even the two-word 'Free.' earns its place as a cost signal.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so fully (valid boolean plus enumerated failure codes). Combined with supported signature formats and the single-use constraint, an agent has everything needed to call it and interpret the result.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real semantics: verification targets the address holding the name right now rather than whatever 'address' the caller supplies, which reframes the optional address parameter and explains the not_holder/holder_changed codes. It still does not say what happens when the supplied address disagrees.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and object (checks a signature against the address currently holding the name) and anchors it to the lifecycle step 'after create_challenge, when the other party returns a signature.' That distinguishes it from the producing tool and from generic verification siblings without needing their schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit trigger condition (the counterparty has returned a signature) and a predecessor (create_challenge), which is strong when-to-use guidance. It does not state when NOT to use it or route to a different verification tool, so it falls short of full alternative-routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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