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Broadcast a signed proof

broadcast
DestructiveIdempotent

Use after create_proof, once you have signed the PSBT with your own wallet. Relays the signed proof transaction to the Bitcoin network. Send the record_id from create_proof plus either signed_psbt (base64 or hex, finalized or signed) or signed_tx_hex. The server checks it is exactly the transaction it composed and pays the exact service fee, then broadcasts and returns the txid. This spends the coins in the transaction and cannot be undone. Rate limit: 40 per hour per IP. You may also broadcast the signed hex yourself (e.g. mempool.space); the proof is valid either way.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "record_id": "<record_id>"
    },
    "name": "broadcast"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
record_idYesrecord_id returned by create_proof.
signed_psbtNoSigned PSBT, base64 or hex.
signed_tx_hexNoFully signed raw transaction hex (alternative to signed_psbt).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructive/openWorld/idempotent, but the description adds genuinely new behavior: the server validates the transaction matches what it composed and that it pays the exact service fee, the call returns a txid, it spends coins irreversibly, and there is a 40/hour per-IP rate limit. That is exactly the extra context annotations cannot convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the trigger condition, then purpose, then arguments, then the destructive warning and rate limit. Every sentence carries distinct information — no repetition of the schema or the annotations.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description supplies the return value (txid), the irreversible side effect, the validation performed server-side, and the rate limit. For a destructive, open-world, 3-parameter tool this covers everything an agent needs to invoke it safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline would be 3, but the description adds meaning the schema cannot express: signed_psbt and signed_tx_hex are alternatives (send one or the other), and the PSBT may be base64 or hex and either finalized or merely signed. The only gap is that it does not say which one wins if both are supplied.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — relays a signed proof transaction to the Bitcoin network — and ties itself to its predecessor create_proof, so an agent can distinguish it from get_proof_status or verify without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says to use it after create_proof and only once the PSBT is signed, and offers a named alternative path (broadcast the hex yourself via mempool.space). It does not state any when-not conditions relative to sibling tools such as get_proof_status, which keeps it short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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