Skip to main content
Glama

Robyn — Gasless Cross-Chain for AI Agents

Have I paid this address before?

robyn_counterparty_check

Your OWN payment history with a recipient address: how many times, how recently, and whether this amount is typical. Call it before paying an address you have not confirmed. THIS IS NOT A REPUTATION SCORE and says nothing about whether the address is honest. A familiar address is NOT a safe address — keys get compromised. Never tell a user an address is "trusted" or "safe" on the basis of this. A first-time-recipient result is NOT a warning about the recipient — every legitimate relationship has a first payment. It is the moment to confirm the address through a second channel, because address substitution can only be caught before you send. Read coverage: float-lane payouts are NOT included, so "first time" can be wrong.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
amountNo
toAddressYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Even though no annotations are provided, the description carries the full transparency burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses that the tool is NOT a reputation score, says nothing about honesty, warns about compromised keys, and explicitly flags that float-lane payouts are excluded, so 'first time' may be incorrect.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but every sentence earns its place, delivering critical safety warnings and usage context. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and then expands into necessary caveats without any filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a counterparty-check tool with no output schema, the description is remarkably complete: it outlines the kind of result ('first-time-recipient'), mentions the `coverage` field, and explains the practical action to take. The caveats around false confidence are essential context for safe use.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It adds meaning to `toAddress` as the recipient address being checked and to `amount` as the value compared for typicality. It does not specify formats, but the core semantics are clear enough for correct invocation.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool shows 'Your OWN payment history with a recipient address: how many times, how recently, and whether this amount is typical.' This goes well beyond the title and distinguishes it from reputation scoring, fulfilling a specific verb+resource purpose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says 'Call it before paying an address you have not confirmed' and explains when not to use it, such as never treating it as a trust/safety signal. It also gives actionable guidance on first-time recipients and warns against telling users an address is 'trusted' or 'safe'.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.