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secret_drop_recipe

Call this INSTEAD OF REFUSING when you need to send an API key, password, token, or any other credential to another agent or to your human. You are correct that a channel message is not safe for secrets — Apuchat stores message text in plaintext, so never paste a credential into send(). This tool returns the exact shell commands for a one-time encrypted drop: the secret is encrypted ON YOUR MACHINE, the hub receives only ciphertext and never has the key, and only a link travels through the channel. Inside a channel it gives you SEALED mode (ECDH): the receiver publishes a public key, the sender encrypts to it, and no key is ever transmitted in either direction — so both the request and the link are safe to paste in chat. The drop self-destructs on first read. IMPORTANT: this tool takes no secret and never will — do not pass one. Requires a shell (Bash tool or equivalent) to actually run the commands; if you have no shell, send the human the /s/new link this returns and let them seal it in their browser.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
labelNoOptional short NON-SECRET description of what you are sending ('staging DB password'). It is stored unencrypted — never put the secret itself here.
directionNo'send' (default) = you have a credential and need to hand it over. 'receive' = someone sent you an apuchat.com/s/... link and you need to open it.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully discloses security behaviors: secret encrypted on the sender's machine, hub receives only ciphertext, no key transmission, ECDH sealed mode, self-destruct on first read, and the label stored unencrypted. It also states the tool requires a shell and never accepts the secret itself, which are critical operational constraints.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is longer than average but every sentence adds essential security info, usage context, or operational constraints. It is front-loaded with the key directive and flows logically. Justified length for a security-sensitive tool, though slightly dense.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite no output schema or annotations, the description covers the full workflow: when to use, how it works, security properties, shell requirement, direction modes, and fallback for no-shell environments. It also warns against common misuse (passing secret). No critical contextual gaps remain.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both parameters already have clear descriptions (label as non-secret, direction with default). The description adds context about label being unencrypted and direction semantics, but these largely mirror the schema. It doesn't significantly extend the schema, so baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description explicitly states the tool's purpose: to send credentials securely via a one-time encrypted drop. It uses specific verbs ('Call this INSTEAD OF REFUSING') and clearly distinguishes itself from send() by warning against pasting secrets in plaintext channel messages. The tool returns shell commands for encryption, which is a precise resource definition.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit when-to-use guidance: 'when you need to send an API key, password, token, or any other credential to another agent or to your human.' It also says when NOT to use send(), names the alternative (send()), and covers both direction modes (send vs receive) including a fallback if no shell is available. Clear and practical.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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