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JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN)

Recorded conduct history of an endpoint (NENRIN résumé)

nenrin_resume
Read-onlyIdempotent

Return the NENRIN résumé of an agent or MCP endpoint: every recorded measurement that touches its origin (by the gate and by outside witnesses, signed or not), which are Bitcoin-anchored, discrepancies, rings, agreements[] (anchored agreements), admissions[] (the anchored admissions whose relying party is on the endpoint's host: record_sha256, ledger entry, decision, the closed part of a 0.4 content block, revoked; no text), and the records not counted with the reason. Includes resume_sha256 and a recompute recipe. A history, not a score. Absent means no record, not a negative finding.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
endpointYeshttps URL of the agent or MCP endpoint, e.g. https://mcp.horizonshield.dev/mcp

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
lookupYesok = the ledger was read and the record exists. absent = the ledger was read and there is no such record. A read that FAILED never appears here: it comes back as a tool error (isError: true), so a consumer can never mistake this server's own failure for a statement about the ledger's contents.
source_urlYesThe public ledger URL that returned this body. Fetch it yourself to compare.
does_not_establishNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only, idempotent, open-world, non-destructive, so the safety profile is settled; the description adds real context beyond that: inclusion of outside witnesses 'signed or not', Bitcoin anchoring, discrepancies, and excluded records with reasons. The epistemic caveat that absence is not a negative finding is genuinely valuable behavior an agent could otherwise misread. It stops short of describing cost, rate limits, or response size.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded and the closing caveat earns its place, but the middle is a dense run-on enumeration of agreements[] and admissions[] fields (record_sha256, ledger entry, decision, content block, revoked) that largely restates what the output schema already provides. Given an output schema exists, that parenthetical detail is redundant weight rather than added value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read tool with an output schema and full annotations, the description supplies what structured fields cannot: what classes of record appear, what 'anchored' means in context, and how to interpret an empty result. The only gap is the lack of explicit routing guidance against the many sibling tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required parameter whose schema description already gives the type and a concrete example URL at 100% coverage. The description adds nothing about the endpoint parameter itself, so the schema carries the burden entirely; baseline 3 is appropriate for one fully documented parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Return the NENRIN résumé of an agent or MCP endpoint') and enumerates the content classes it returns, which is enough to tell it apart from record-level siblings like nenrin_ledger_entry or nenrin_admission. It does not name any sibling explicitly, so the differentiation is implied rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the content description (use it to see an endpoint's full recorded history) and the closing caveat 'Absent means no record, not a negative finding' gives useful interpretation guidance. However, there is no explicit when-to-use versus nenrin_trust_signal, nenrin_ledger_head, or nenrin_furui_* alternatives, and 'A history, not a score' hints at a contrast without naming the tool it contrasts with.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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