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Mitigant

launch_scenario

Destructive

Run a multi-step attack chain against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once every step finishes. This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure, as several attacks in sequence -- it is not a simulation, and its blast radius is the combined blast radius of every step. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one scenario in list_scenarios, show them the matching candidates with their names and descriptions and have them pick one -- don't guess which scenario they meant.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
regionNoOptional: the region to run the scenario in (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-3). Omit to use the account's default region (the defaultRegion from list_cloud_accounts); passing a region here does not change the account's default for other users.
account_noYesTarget account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID
scenario_keyYesThe scenario's key to launch (an opaque id) -- from list_scenarios or get_scenario_details
cloud_serviceYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Despite annotations already marking this destructive and non-read-only, the description adds critical operational context: it performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure, is not a simulation, and has the combined blast radius of every step. It also adds a confirmation requirement and ambiguity-handling instructions, which are valuable beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the tool action, then immediately states the real-world destructive impact, then gives the confirmation and scenario-selection requirement. Every sentence contributes operational value with no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive multi-step tool, it covers the essential warning, blast radius, confirmation behavior, and scenario selection process. It is not fully complete because there is no output schema and the description only briefly says it returns the result after every step, without describing the result shape or any cleanup path.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 75%, with region, account_no, and scenario_key already well described in the schema. The description reinforces that scenario_key comes from list_scenarios or get_scenario_details, but it does not add much parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, and cloud_service has no description in either place.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: run a multi-step attack chain against a cloud account connected to Mitigant. It clearly implies a scenario-based, multi-step operation, but it does not explicitly contrast itself with the sibling launch_attack tool, so sibling differentiation is incomplete.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives strong pre-call guidance: confirm with the user, and if the request could match multiple scenarios from list_scenarios, show candidates and have the user pick one. However, it does not explicitly say when to use launch_scenario instead of launch_attack or other alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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