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Mitigant

launch_attack

Destructive

Run an attack against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once it finishes. This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure -- it is not a simulation. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one attack in list_attacks (similar names, or an underspecified description like "the security group attack"), show them the matching candidates with their names and descriptions and have them pick one -- don't guess which attack they meant.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
regionNoOptional: the region to run the attack in (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-3). Omit to use the account's default region (the defaultRegion from list_cloud_accounts); passing a region here does not change the account's default for other users. Evidence is collected in whichever region the attack runs in.
account_noYesTarget account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID
action_keyYesThe attack's attackType value to launch (an opaque id, not attackName) -- from list_attacks or get_attack_details
cloud_serviceYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, but the description adds crucial context beyond that: it performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure, is not a simulation, and is synchronous (returns once it finishes). The user-confirmation requirement is a behavioral constraint not captured by any annotation, and it directly complements the destructive flag.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and scope, then the safety warning, then disambiguation guidance. Every sentence earns its place; the final clause is long but carries the most important operational constraint so the density is justified.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, and the description says only that the result is returned on completion, without describing its shape — but sibling tools (get_attack_evidence, get_attack_status) plausibly cover retrieval. Safety, blocking behavior, and prerequisite tooling are all covered, leaving only the result payload underspecified.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75% with detailed per-field descriptions (region default behavior, account identifier formats, action_key being attackType vs attackName). The description only alludes to action_key selection via list_attacks, adding little beyond what the schema already states. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Run an attack against a cloud account connected to Mitigant') and its scope ('return the result once it finishes'), which distinguishes it from siblings like launch_scenario, get_attack_status, and get_attack_evidence. An agent can tell exactly what this does without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit when-to-use conditions and a disambiguation procedure: confirm with the user first, and if the request could match multiple entries in list_attacks, show candidates with names and descriptions rather than guessing. It names the concrete alternative tool (list_attacks) and the failure mode ('the security group attack') it prevents.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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