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Mitigant

get_attack_evidence

Read-only

Get the evidence Mitigant collected for a previously launched attack -- what the account's own logging (CloudTrail, GuardDuty) recorded about it. Returns an 'evidence' summary (counts, sources, and a plain-language statement) plus the raw records, each with an evidenceUrl that opens the matching console entry. Use it to show the user what their defenses saw, especially during the clean-up inspection window. Important: an empty result shortly after an attack is normal -- logging delivery lags by minutes -- and an attack whose purpose is to disable logging is expected to leave none, so never report an empty result as the attack leaving no trace; re-check instead. Read evidence.statement and relay it.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
attack_idYesThe attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only cover read-only safety, and the description adds substantial context beyond them: the return shape (counts, sources, plain-language statement, raw records with evidenceUrl), a delivery-lag caveat, and a specific adversarial case where empty is expected. The warning against misinterpreting empty results is exactly the kind of behavioral detail structured fields cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose, then return shape, then usage, then the critical caveat. No sentence is filler — even the 'relay evidence.statement' instruction changes agent behavior. Dense but appropriately so for the number of behavioral warnings it must convey.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must describe returns, and it does — summary object, raw records, evidenceUrl semantics. Combined with the empty-result interpretation guidance, an agent has everything needed to call and correctly report on this tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single attack_id parameter already documents that it comes from launch_attack / launch_scenario, so the description adds little parameter-level meaning. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema fully carries this load.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

A specific verb and resource — evidence Mitigant collected for a previously launched attack — scoped further by naming the data source (the account's own CloudTrail/GuardDuty logging). That framing clearly separates it from get_attack_details and get_attack_status, which concern the attack object rather than observed telemetry.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says when to use it: to show the user what their defenses saw, especially during the clean-up window. It also gives a strong do-not (never report an empty result as the attack leaving no trace, re-check instead). It does not name an alternative sibling for adjacent needs, which is the only thing keeping this from a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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