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Mitigant

get_attack_details

Read-only

Full description, impact, MITRE mapping, and orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- PROVISIONED attacks create and destroy their own target rather than targeting your existing infrastructure (they may still read or use existing resources along the way), so they're the lower-risk, production-viable choice; INLINE attacks find and attack an existing resource in the account) for one attack, by the action key from list_attacks. Result includes attackName (show this to the user) alongside the attackType you passed in (an opaque id, not for display).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
action_keyYesThe attack's attackType value (an opaque id, e.g. IAM_CREATE_USER -- not attackName) from list_attacks
cloud_serviceYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The readOnly/destructive annotations already cover safety, and the description adds substantive context the annotations don't: the PROVISIONED vs INLINE distinction with a risk explanation that materially affects interpretation of results. It doesn't cover error behavior on an invalid key or cloud_service mismatch, so it isn't fully complete.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose is front-loaded, but the single sentence is overloaded with deeply nested parentheticals explaining orchestration type, which makes it hard to parse. The content earns its place, but the structure could be split into separate sentences or bullets.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully enumerates what the result contains (attackName, attackType) and explains the orchestration-type field. Gaps remain around invalid-key behavior and whether cloud_service must match the value used in list_attacks.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50%, but the description compensates by explaining that action_key is the opaque attackType id rather than the human-readable attackName, and that the result echoes back both values. The cloud_service enum is self-explanatory and needs no elaboration.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource: it returns the full description, impact, MITRE mapping, and orchestration type for one attack, keyed by action_key. It clearly distinguishes itself from list_attacks (the source of the key) and implicitly from get_attack_status/get_attack_evidence by declaring which fields it returns.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It tells the agent where the required action_key comes from ('the action key from list_attacks') and warns that the returned attackType is an opaque id, not for display, while attackName should be shown to the user. There's no explicit when-not or statement of alternatives such as get_attack_evidence, but the call context is clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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