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Mitigant

clean_up_attack

Clean up a previously launched attack, restoring the cloud resources it changed back to their pre-attack state. Clean-up is normally AUTOMATIC after a short, deliberate inspection window (so the team can verify the attack and collect evidence first); calling this kicks it off immediately rather than waiting out that window. It is NOT a fix for a stall, and it ends that window early -- removing the attack's artifacts before the team may have finished inspecting them -- so only use it when the user explicitly wants the account restored now. This triggers clean-up and returns immediately -- clean-up runs in the background, so a success here means the request was accepted, not that clean-up is done. Confirm the account is actually restored by polling get_attack_status until cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true; do not tell the user it is restored based on this call alone.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
attack_idYesThe attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call
cloud_serviceYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations only say readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=false, but the description adds the critical async semantics: the call returns immediately, cleanup runs in the background, and success means only that the request was accepted. It also warns that this ends the inspection window early and removes artifacts, which is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded: the core action comes first, followed by safety conditions and the return-value caveat. It is a bit long and restates the inspection-window rationale more than once, but every sentence ultimately supports correct use.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an async mutation with no output schema, the description covers what is needed: what it does, when it should and should not be used, that it is asynchronous, and how to verify completion via get_attack_status. Nothing important is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50%, and the description does not discuss either parameter. attack_id is documented in the schema, but cloud_service has no description in either place beyond its enum values. The description adds no meaning beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Clean up a previously launched attack, restoring the cloud resources it changed back to their pre-attack state.' That clearly distinguishes it from the launch_* and get_* siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit use conditions ('only use it when the user explicitly wants the account restored now'), explains the default automatic behavior and why this call overrides it, and rules out misuse ('It is NOT a fix for a stall').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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