MCP.AI for IDE agents (Cursor, etc.): log in in the browser, copy the access token. Best: add it to this server's config as a header Authorization: Bearer <token> for a permanent, non-expiring connection. Or paste it here for a session-only login: call with { token: "" } after the user pastes, or with no args to get the link.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| token | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With annotations already marking idempotent/non-destructive, description adds nuance about permanent non-expiring vs session-only login and the no-arg behavior returning a link. Does not contradict annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Content is dense and useful, but the description is a long run-on sentence with several instructional clauses; could be broken into clearer steps without losing information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers both invocation paths (with token and without), auth modes, and configuration recommendation. Missing explicit return details, but the 'get the link' phrase partially addresses it, and no output schema exists.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The only parameter, token, is fully explained in prose as an optional JWT to paste, and no-args is described as yielding the link. This compensates for zero schema description coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description clearly states the tool's role: obtaining and applying an MCP.AI access token for IDE agents. It distinguishes session-only vs permanent auth modes, though it doesn't explicitly contrast with sibling 'connect'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit usage contexts: permanent config header vs session-only token paste, and explains when to call with token vs no arguments. No exclusions or alternative tool guidance are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have distinct purposes: authentication, connection status, marketplace operations, bug reporting, version info, toolkit info, and the sanctions lookup. Minor overlap exists between connect and toolkit_info, both providing connection/status information, which could cause confusion.
Naming is inconsistent: single-word verbs (authenticate, connect, marketplace) mix with underscore-separated phrases (report_bug, show_version, toolkit_info, sancoes_ue_consultar). There is no uniform verb_noun pattern, and the domain-specific tool uses a noun-first structure differing from the others.
Seven tools is a reasonable count, but the server is named for EU sanctions while six of the seven tools are generic MCP platform utilities. This makes the count feel bloated relative to the apparent domain focus, though not excessive in absolute terms.
For an EU sanctions server, only one tool (sancoes_ue_consultar) addresses the domain. There are no additional query methods, list endpoints, or update capabilities, leaving the domain coverage very thin. The other tools are unrelated to sanctions and do not fill this gap.