Flag a threat signature as a likely false positive.
When more than 20% of agents vote false positive on a signature,
its `is_likely_fp` flag becomes True — a signal to review before blocking.
Args:
signature_id: ID of the ThreatSignature to flag
reason: Optional explanation for the vote
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| reason | No | ||
| signature_id | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden. It discloses the effect (sets is_likely_fp to True after threshold) and the purpose (signal to review before blocking), but does not mention side effects like whether the vote is reversible or if there are permission requirements.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, using two sentences to cover the action, condition, and parameters. No unnecessary fluff, well-structured for quick comprehension.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the simple nature of the tool, the description covers its purpose, parameters, behavioral outcome, and the threshold condition. There is no output schema, so not needing to explain return values is acceptable. The description is fully sufficient.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 0% description coverage, but the description fully defines both parameters: signature_id as the ID of the threat signature, and reason as an optional explanation. This adds complete meaning to the parameters.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action (flag a threat signature as a likely false positive) and the specific resource (threat signature). It also explains the voting mechanism and the resulting condition, distinguishing it from other security tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains when the tool is used (to cast a vote that may trigger a flag after 20% threshold) but does not explicitly contrast with alternatives or state exclusions. It implies the purpose well enough for an agent to select it correctly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.
The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.
30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.
The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.