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Nullcone Threat Intelligence

validate_skill

Synchronous SKILL IOC lookup — call this before loading or invoking any
MCP tool/skill to check it against the Nullcone threat feed.

This is the pre-invocation enforcement hook. Returns an allow/warn/block
decision based on whether the skill hash is a known-malicious indicator.

Args:
    skill_hash:   SHA256 of the skill manifest (preferred identifier)
    skill_name:   Human-readable skill name (for logging)
    manifest_url: URL of the skill manifest (fallback if hash unknown)

Returns:
    risk:         "clean" | "suspicious" | "malicious"
    action:       "allow" | "warn" | "block"
    confidence:   0-100
    signature_id: DB id of matching IOC (if found)
    family_name:  Associated malware family (if known)
    reason:       Human-readable explanation

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
skill_hashYes
skill_nameNo
manifest_urlNo

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Even with no annotations to support it, the description transparently discloses the synchronous nature, the decision logic (allow/warn/block based on known-malicious hash), and the informational fields it returns. It could be richer about side effects like logging or external calls, but it largely carries the burden well.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear sections for arguments and return values, each with no wasted words. Every line adds value, and the format is easily scannable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description wisely documents all return fields (risk, action, confidence, signature_id, family_name, reason), making the tool self-contained. It loses one point for not covering edge cases like error behavior or rate limiting, but it is otherwise sufficient for an agent to use it effectively.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, but the description fully compensates by explaining each of the 3 parameters, including their preferred usage ('preferred identifier' for skill_hash, 'for logging' for skill_name, and 'fallback if hash unknown' for manifest_url), going beyond the schema's type-only definitions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states this is a 'Synchronous SKILL IOC lookup' and explicitly instructs to 'call this before loading or invoking any MCP tool/skill', which distinguishes it from siblings like check_freshness or lookup_ioc. The resource (skill) and action (validate against a threat feed) are unambiguous and specific.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit timing ('before loading or invoking'), a clear use case ('pre-invocation enforcement hook'), and distinguishes the identifier hierarchy (hash preferred, URL fallback). However, it doesn't explicitly mention when not to use it or contrast with a direct alternative, which would fully earn a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.

Naming Consistency3/5

The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.

Tool Count3/5

30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.