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Nullcone Threat Intelligence

subscribe_threats

Open a named, stateful subscription to live threat push delivery.

Returns a subscription_id. Pass it to drain_subscription() to collect
the IOCs that have arrived since your last drain — zero polling, each
caller gets their own isolated stream.

Multiple subscribers receive independent copies of every matching IOC.
Subscriptions expire after 1 hour of inactivity (no drain calls).

Composition filters let you narrow the stream:
  - ioc_types: only deliver these IOC types (empty = all)
  - families:  only deliver IOCs from these malware families (empty = all)
  - tags:      only deliver IOCs with at least one of these tags (empty = all)

Requires the MCP server to be running in SSE mode (MCP_TRANSPORT=sse)
with a live SpacetimeDB push subscription active.

Args:
    min_severity: Minimum severity to deliver (0-10). Default 5 (medium+).
    ioc_types:    List of IOC types to include. E.g. ["skill","prompt","ip"].
                  Valid: hash_md5, hash_sha1, hash_sha256, ip, ip_port,
                  domain, url, yara, email, mutex, filepath, asn, ja3,
                  imphash, cve, prompt, skill. Empty = all types.
    families:     List of malware family names to include. Empty = all.
    tags:         List of tags — IOC must match at least one. Empty = all.

Returns:
    subscription_id: Opaque ID — pass to drain_subscription() / unsubscribe()
    push_active:     Whether the background push subscription is running
    filters:         Echo of the composition filters applied

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tagsNo
familiesNo
ioc_typesNo
min_severityNo

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses statefulness, subscription expiry, independent copies per subscriber, zero-polling behavior, and the need for SSE mode. The Returns section transparently lists subscription_id, push_active, and filters.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with a clear opening, filter bullet list, prerequisites, and a Returns block. Every sentence adds value—no filler or repetition beyond what is useful for agent understanding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a stateful subscription tool with 4 parameters and no output schema, the description is complete. It covers lifecycle (expiry, drain), isolation semantics, parameter meanings, required infrastructure, and return values, making it sufficient for an agent to invoke correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, but the description fully compensates. It explains min_severity as 0-10 with default 5 (medium+), defines each filter's empty=all behavior, provides an example for ioc_types, and lists all valid IOC type values. This exceeds the schema's bare array definitions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'Open a named, stateful subscription to live threat push delivery,' which clearly identifies the verb, resource, and the stateful streaming nature. It distinguishes itself from sibling polling tools like get_new_threats and poll_since by emphasizing 'zero polling' and the subscription lifecycle.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides clear context for when to use this tool: for live push delivery, with each caller getting an isolated stream and subscriptions expiring after 1 hour of inactivity. It also states the explicit prerequisite of SSE mode and a live SpacetimeDB push subscription, but does not name specific alternatives to avoid, so it stops short of a full when/not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.

Naming Consistency3/5

The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.

Tool Count3/5

30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.