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Nullcone Threat Intelligence

by io.github.maco144

submit_ioc

Submit a threat indicator (IOC) to the shared intelligence network.

The IOC is automatically classified into a malware family, metadata is
compressed, and deduplication is handled atomically. All subscribed agents
see the new IOC instantly.

Args:
    ioc_type:    IOC category. One of: hash_md5, hash_sha1, hash_sha256,
                 ip, ip_port, domain, url, yara, email, mutex, registry,
                 filepath, asn, ja3, imphash, cve, prompt, skill
    value:       The indicator value (e.g. "evil.example.com", "1.2.3.4")
    severity:    0-10. Use Severity enum values: 1=info, 3=low, 5=medium,
                 7=high, 9=critical
    confidence:  0-100 confidence score
    context:     Free-text context about why this is malicious
    tags:        List of tags (e.g. ["c2", "phishing", "ransomware"])
    source:      Origin of the intel (e.g. "honeypot", "sandbox", "osint")
    family_hint: Optional malware family name to skip auto-classification

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tagsNo
valueYes
sourceNomcp
contextNo
ioc_typeYes
severityNo
confidenceNo
family_hintNo

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It discloses that the IOC is auto-classified, metadata is compressed, deduplication is atomic, and all subscribed agents see it instantly. It also notes that family_hint can skip auto-classification. This provides useful side-effect context, though it doesn't cover failure modes or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two paragraphs: an intro that adds behavioral context and a structured Args list. Every sentence contributes value, with no fluff. The list format is scannable and appropriately sized for the parameter count.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex tool with 8 parameters and no output schema, the description covers all parameters thoroughly, explains the processing pipeline, and notes the optional family_hint. It provides complete contextual information for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The description includes an Args section that fully documents all 8 parameters with types, allowed values, and examples. Since schema description coverage is 0%, this completely compensates for the lack of schema descriptions, providing detailed semantics for each field.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states 'Submit a threat indicator (IOC) to the shared intelligence network' - a specific verb and resource. It distinguishes from siblings like submit_batch (batch submission) and lookup_ioc (lookup) by focusing on single IOC submission with automatic enrichment.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage for submitting a single IOC but does not explicitly mention when to use it versus alternatives like submit_batch. No exclusions or contraindications are provided. Usage context is implied by the verb 'submit' and the resource type, but no direct comparison to sibling tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.

Naming Consistency3/5

The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.

Tool Count3/5

30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.

Resources