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Nullcone Threat Intelligence

revoke_ioc

Revoke an IOC by its value hash, pushing the expiration event to all
active subscriptions in real-time.

Call this when an IOC is determined to be a false positive, expired, or
superseded. Subscribed agents receive the revocation event on their next
drain_subscription() call with event_type="revocation".

Args:
    value_hash: SHA256 of {ioc_type}:{value.lower()} — same format as
                IOC.value_hash(). Obtainable from list_revocations() or
                the threat signature record.
    reason:     One of: false_positive, expired, superseded,
                attribution_error, retracted.
    ioc_type:   Original IOC type (optional, for subscriber filtering).

Returns:
    event:  Revocation event details.
    pushed: Number of active subscriptions notified.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reasonNofalse_positive
ioc_typeNo
value_hashYes

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It discloses the real-time push to active subscriptions, the subscriber-facing event_type='revocation', and the return fields (event, pushed). It does not cover error cases, idempotency, or permissions, but the key behavioral side effects are clearly described.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with a front-loaded action, a when-to-call note, and clearly labeled Args and Returns sections. Every sentence adds value and there is no repetition or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutation tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers the essential context: parameter format, reason enums, subscription side effects, and return values. Minor gaps remain around error conditions and whether revocation is idempotent or reversible, but the description is largely complete for an agent to use correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description compensates thoroughly. It explains value_hash's exact format (SHA256 of {ioc_type}:{value.lower()}), lists all valid reason values, and clarifies that ioc_type is optional for subscriber filtering. It even provides provenance for obtaining value_hash from list_revocations() or the threat signature record.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb 'Revoke' + resource 'IOC' + method 'by its value hash' and adds behavioral detail ('pushing the expiration event to all active subscriptions in real-time'). This clearly distinguishes it from siblings like is_ioc_revoked (check) and list_revocations (list).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to call: 'when an IOC is determined to be a false positive, expired, or superseded.' It also explains the downstream effect on subscribers via drain_subscription(). It does not mention when not to use it or reference alternative tools, but the when-to-use is unambiguous.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.

Naming Consistency3/5

The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.

Tool Count3/5

30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.