Skip to main content
Glama

Nullcone Threat Intelligence

by io.github.maco144

report_detection

Report that you detected and acted on a known threat signature.

Increments the signature's detection count and creates a ThreatEvent
visible to all other agents in real-time.

Args:
    signature_id: ID of the ThreatSignature (from submit_ioc or lookup_ioc)
    action:       Action taken. One of: logged, alerted, blocked,
                  quarantined, eradicated
    context:      Optional dict with additional context (process name, path, etc.)

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionYes
contextNo
signature_idYes

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the burden of disclosing side effects. It explicitly states that the tool increments the signature's detection count and creates a ThreatEvent visible to all other agents in real-time. This is meaningful behavioral context beyond the parameter schema, though it does not mention authentication, reversibility, or error conditions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and well-structured: a one-sentence purpose, a one-sentence behavior summary, and a clearly formatted Args block. Every sentence contributes meaningful information with no filler or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 3-parameter tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers purpose, side effects, and parameter semantics adequately. It does not describe return values or failure modes, but the primary behavioral consequences are disclosed, making it sufficiently complete for an agent to invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description fully compensates by explaining all three parameters: signature_id as the ThreatSignature ID from submit_ioc/lookup_ioc, action with the allowed enumerated values, and context as an optional dict with examples. This adds real semantic value beyond the bare JSON schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the action: 'Report that you detected and acted on a known threat signature.' It names the specific resource (report_detection), identifies the mechanism (increments detection count, creates ThreatEvent), and is sharply distinguished from siblings like submit_ioc or vote_false_positive by the reporting semantics.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'Report that you detected and acted on a known threat signature' establishes a clear usage context. It also directs signature_id sourcing from submit_ioc or lookup_ioc, implying the workflow. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusions, but the guidance is sufficient for a straightforward reporting tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Nullcone Threat Intelligence toolsInspect
Try in Browser
RayrunBuild, deploy, and operate MCP servers without becoming an infrastructure team.ray.runAd

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.

Naming Consistency3/5

The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.

Tool Count3/5

30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.

Resources