Return all MCP tools that have been flagged as suspicious or malicious.
Includes tools flagged on initial ingestion (high-risk fingerprint) and tools that showed significant semantic drift on update.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden for behavioral disclosure. It does add useful context about the two flag categories: high-risk fingerprinting on ingestion and semantic drift on update. However, it does not mention whether the list is live, cached, or ordered, nor whether it includes revoked or false-positive entries. This is adequate but not rich for a security-related registry tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description consists of two concise sentences with no wasted words. The first sentence states the primary purpose, and the second identifies the inclusion criteria. All content adds value and the structure is easy to parse quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given that the tool has zero parameters, an output schema exists, and the full scope is 'all tools flagged' with explicit mention of both reporting-flags categories, the description is complete. It tells the agent the exact universe of results without needing further mention of filtering, return value formatting, or side effects.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has an empty properties object, so there are no parameters to clarify. The description therefore does not need to add parameter-level semantics. The baseline of 4 for zero-parameter tools applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a direct and specific statement: 'Return all MCP tools that have been flagged as suspicious or malicious.' This clearly identifies the action, resource, and scope. The second sentence adds distinguishing detail by identifying the two categories of flags included, helping differentiate it from sibling threat-listing tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description does not provide guidance on when to use this tool versus the many related siblings such as recent_threats, get_new_threats, or fingerprint_tool_metadata. There are no exclusions, alternatives, or contextual cues about a preferred use case. The inclusion criteria are stated, but they do not operationalize the decision of when this tool is the right one.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.
The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.
30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.
The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.
