Return the most recently observed threat signatures.
Args:
limit: Max number of results to return (1-200)
min_severity: Minimum severity level (0-10). Default 5 (medium+)
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| min_severity | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations are absent, so the description carries the disclosure burden. It communicates a read-style operation, temporal ordering, and parameter ranges, but does not mention time windows, pagination, auth requirements, or absence of side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and scannable, with a one-sentence purpose followed by a two-line parameter list. Every sentence contributes new information without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read tool with two optional parameters and an output schema, the description covers purpose and parameter semantics well. It only lacks explicit placement relative to sibling tools and a note on any operational constraints, preventing a top score.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The Args block enriches both schema properties: limit gets a 1-200 range and min_severity gets a 0-10 scale with default 5 meaning 'medium+'. This adds meaning beyond the bare type/default entries in the input schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence 'Return the most recently observed threat signatures' uses a specific verb and resource with a temporal scope. This clearly differentiates the tool from siblings like family_threats and search_by_type by specifying recency.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance is provided, and no sibling alternatives are mentioned. The recency framing only weakly implies a retrieval scenario, and potential overlap with get_new_threats is unaddressed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.
The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.
30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.
The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.