Look up a threat signature by its exact IOC value.
Returns the full signature record if found, including severity, family,
detection count, and false positive votes.
Args:
value: The exact IOC value to search for (e.g. "evil.example.com")
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| value | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden for behavioral disclosure. It states that the full signature record is returned if found and lists included fields, which is useful, but it does not describe behavior when the IOC is not found, such as returning null or raising an error, nor does it state that this is a read-only operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise and well-structured: a clear first sentence stating the purpose, a second sentence summarizing the return value, and a short Args section for the parameter. Every line adds necessary information with no redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple single-parameter lookup tool with no output schema or annotations, the description adequately covers purpose, return contents, and parameter semantics. It falls short only by not specifying the not-found response, which would make it fully complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema only provides the parameter name and type, but the description adds meaning by explaining that the value must be the exact IOC and gives an example ('evil.example.com'). This is sufficient for a single string parameter, though it could add details like case sensitivity or expected formatting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource: 'Look up a threat signature by its exact IOC value.' It clearly distinguishes from sibling tools like search_by_type by emphasizing exact IOC lookup, making the tool's purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'by its exact IOC value' implies the tool should be used when the caller has a specific IOC and needs the full signature, conveying when to use it. However, it does not explicitly mention alternatives or state when not to use this tool versus sibling tools like search_by_type or is_ioc_revoked.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is notable overlap among threat-fetching methods: get_new_threats, poll_since, and drain_subscription all retrieve new threats via different mechanisms, and several stats tools (get_stats, freshness_limits, prompt_cache_stats) serve similar informational roles. Overall, descriptions help disambiguate, but a few tools could be confused.
The naming is predominantly snake_case, but mixes verb_noun (check_freshness, submit_ioc), noun phrases (family_threats, freshness_limits), and even a question (is_ioc_revoked). 'unsubscribe' breaks the pattern of other subscription tools (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription). This inconsistency is noticeable though still readable.
30 tools is on the heavy side for a single MCP server, exceeding the typical 15-tool comfort zone. However, the server covers a broad domain—IOC submission, retrieval, subscriptions, freshness tracking, prompt/skill scanning, and registry monitoring—so the large number is somewhat justified by the scope.
The tool surface covers the full threat intelligence lifecycle: submit (submit_ioc, submit_batch), query (lookup_ioc, search_by_type, recent_threats, family_threats), subscribe (subscribe_threats, drain_subscription), update (report_detection, vote_false_positive), and revoke (revoke_ioc). Minor gaps exist, such as the absence of a direct delete or update signature tool and no get-by-signature-id endpoint, but these are manageable for agents.